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2ABSTRACT
The Confucius Institutes (CIs) are part of a major new Chinese Government initiative 
promoting the learning of the Chinese language and culture internationally. They operate 
through a network of institutes located in learning institutions around the world, and while 
they have an education focus, they also reflect political changes in China’s relationship 
with the rest of the world. A transformation in China’s approach to foreign relations has 
been evident since the belligerence and self-sufficiency of the Mao era, and cautious 
engagement of the Deng era. In the early 21st century, China’s new foreign policy is more 
confident and engaged behaviour than it has ever been. The conceptual sources of China’s 
foreign policy have broadened from Marxism-Leninism to include some contemporary 
international values and traditional Chinese norms. However, managing the sphere of ideas 
both domestically and externally, and securing the nation’s economic development, are the
main means the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) maintains its legitimacy in the early 21st
century. While China’s leadership has given the CIs considerable political independence, 
they are part of the Party’s propaganda system. Despite some foreign concerns about the 
Confucius Institutes being a propaganda tool, many other countries have similar 
programmes; the difference is China’s political system. Through the CIs, China is building 
the architecture of a major power, and has succeeded in improving its international 
influence. But because of the lack of international attractiveness of China’s political 
system, this is likely to be slow. The CIs reflect a more confident and effective Chinese 
foreign policy; and one that offers greater opportunities for engagement.
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9Chapter One
INTRODUCTION
“you peng zi yuangfang lai, bu yi le hu”
Translation: To have friends coming from afar: is this not a delight?2
Kongzi (Confucius)
Background
The words of Confucius on welcoming visitors from afar could be an appropriate 
question for universities around the world to ask when they are faced with a proposal to 
host one of China’s contemporary language and cultural centres known as the 
Confucius Institutes (CIs). The CIs focus on the promotion of the Chinese language3
and culture internationally, and one of their aims is “deepening friendly relations 
between China and other countries.”4 In the context of China’s rise as a world economic 
power, there is scholarly interest in how China will deal with concerns that its rise will 
disrupt the existing international system. Begun in 2004, the CIs are ostensibly joint 
ventures between a host university, a Chinese university and a leading organisation 
connected to China’s state bureaucracy with some foreign representatives. However, 
some concerns have been raised about the CIs being a subversive means to influence 
foreign public opinion and a threat to academic independence. Chinese foreign policy 
since 1949 was noted for its revolutionary socialism but since the 1990s it is evolving 
towards greater engagement and stability as a precondition for economic development. 
The location of the CIs reflects China’s trading relationships rather than its previous 
  
2 Confucius, The Analects of Confucius, trans. Simon Lyes (New York; London, [U.K.]  W.W. Norton, 1997).p. 9.
3 There are many different languages spoken the People’s Republic of China, and Taiwan where there are 56 
official ethnicities, many of whom have their own languages, and there are at least six mutually unintelligible 
dialects within the majority Han ethnicity. The language most widely spoken and promoted by the national 
government is Modern Standard Mandarin, henceforth called “the Chinese language.”
4  Confucius Institutes  “Introduction to the Confucius Institutes,” http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-
08/29/content_22308.htm (Accessed October 16, 2009).
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socialist ideological alliances, and the extent to which they reflect a new approach to 
dealing with the rest of the world is the focus of this thesis. The era of globalisation has 
produced many changes in international relations, such as the increased importance of 
culture, and there is interest from scholars and policy makers as to how China will turn 
its cultural resources into political influence. As China continues its rise as an economic 
power, the CIs are rapidly developing a network to encourage the learning of the 
Chinese language, which may have major implications for China and the rest of the 
world. This thesis is part of a larger project on China’s propaganda system,5 and one of 
the issues it will address is the role of the CIs in China’s modernised foreign 
propaganda.
A problem this thesis investigates is the disjunct between critics of the CIs who argue 
that they are a tool for CCP propaganda and a threat to academic independence of 
learning institutions, and some of those involved with the CIs who emphasise that they
have more benign intentions. According to Zhao Guocheng, Deputy Chief Executive of 
Hanban (the Chinese state organisation which helps promote the Chinese language
internationally), “the CIs’ core work is not to promote certain values, but to respond to 
the demands of foreign countries, and supply services and information about China to 
those who are interested in it.” 6 In the light of China’s modernisation and 
transformation since 1978, its rise as a major world power, and concerns that this 
represents a threat to global stability and other major powers, the basic question of this 
thesis is, “To what extent do the CIs represent change in China’s foreign policy?” The 
Conclusion will show that the CIs reflect China’s new foreign policies in the 21st
century which have evolved to be much more confident, effective and engaged than at 
any time in its history.
This thesis also discusses the relationship between language and power, as throughout 
history, a common language has long been associated with hegemonic power.7 Major 
powers such as the Greeks, Romans, ancient Chinese, Arab, Russians, Malay, 
Portuguese, Spanish, French, English and Russians, have all promoted their languages 
  
5 For more information on the project “Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China, see: 
http://www.saps.canterbury.ac.nz/pols/research/marsden_brady.shtml  (Accessed October 19, 2009).
6 Ni Yanshuo, "Confucius Around the World"  Beijing Review 2008, http://www.bjreview.com.cn/nation/txt/2008-
03/04/content_102406.htm  (Accessed March 4, 2009).
7 Sheng Ding and Robert Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global 
Promotion of the Chinese Language," East Asia 23, no. 2 (2006) p. 1.
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as a tool for unity across time and space.8 The CIs have an educational appearance, and 
this has tended to obscure their potential as a tool of political influence. While much 
attention is focused on the rise of China as an economic and military power, less 
attention has been focused on the rise of China as a cultural power, and how its 
literature, films, music, art, customs and sport (as well as its language), are practised 
beyond its borders.
The operation of the CIs
The CIs seek to support and develop the interest of non-Mandarin-speaking foreigners
and overseas Chinese in learning the Chinese language. Much of this interest has been 
stimulated by China’s re-emergence as an economic power. The fundamental purpose 
of the CIs is to promote the Chinese language and culture. According to their 
Constitution, they devote themselves to; 
· Satisfying the demands of people from different countries and 
regions in the world who learn the Chinese language, 
· Enhancing understanding of the Chinese language and culture by 
these peoples, 
· Strengthening educational and cultural exchange and cooperation 
between China and other countries, 
· Deepening friendly relationships with other nations, 
· Promoting the development of multi-culturalism, 
· and creating a harmonious world.9
Outwardly, the CIs are governed by the 33 member CI Leadership Council, comprising 
of a senior Chinese politician, state bureaucracy representatives, educational agencies 
and foreign representatives. An educational focus is apparent from the CI website,10 but 
  
8 Ibid.  p. 2.
9 Confucius Institutes, “Constitution and Bylaws of the Confucius Institutes,” 
http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22323.htm  (Accessed October 16, 2009). 
10 http://www.confuciusinstitute.net/  Accessed August 16, 2009. 
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Chinese leaders such as President Hu Jintao also support their work and link it to 
China’s rise as a world power.11
CIs operate with three models of operation; they can be wholly operated by the Beijing 
headquarters (like British Council branches), joint ventures with local partners (like 
Spain’s Instituto Cervantes branches), or wholly locally run offices licensed by the 
Beijing headquarters (like many Alliance Française branches).12 Most CIs fall into the 
second category, which is less expensive to maintain. Beijing Review notes that 
according to the Hanban schedule, China aims to develop 500 CIs by the end of 2010,13
and one report mentioned the intention to establish 1000 by 2020.14 Most of the CI 
Directors are not directly appointed by China, but are appointed by the local CI board 
which consists of local people who are Chinese language specialists, and an appointee 
from the CI Leadership Council.
Most CIs are joint ventures between a Chinese university and a foreign learning 
institution, usually a university but sometimes another type of education organisation. 
They are individually governed by representatives from the host institution and Chinese 
representatives who devise individual programmes suited to the local area. The 
Constitution of the CI programme state that they are guided by the Leadership Council
and must respect local, as well as Chinese, laws and customs.15 The Chinese university 
partner supplies language teachers, who can train local teachers, while the host partner 
supplies office space and additional staff. The institutes are a centre to learn standard 
Mandarin, hear about doing business with China, as well as listen to various guest 
speakers, and learn about Chinese culture. 
The choice of Chinese universities involved in CI partnerships appears to follow a 
pattern of existing links. According to Xiaolin Guo, personal contacts of Chinese 
scholars play a role and existing exchange agreements between Chinese and foreign 
  
11 Xinhua Hu Jintao Calls for Enhancing 'Soft Power' of Chinese Culture.  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2007-10/15/content_6883748.htm (November 24, 2008).
12 Don Starr, "Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes," European Journal of Education
44, no. 1 (2009) p. 70.
13 Beijing Review, "More Confucius Institutes Founded."  January 4, 2007 
http://www.bjreview.com/culture/txt/2007-01/04/content_52327.htm  (Accessed September 6, 2008).
14 Xinhuanet 2006 Confucius Institute: Promoting Language, Culture and Friendliness 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2006-10/02/content_5521722.htm  (Accessed June 12, 2008). 
15 The Confucius Institute, Constitution and Bylaws, Sections 1.6 and 3.12, 
http://college.chinese.cn/en/article/2009-08/29/content_22310.htm  (Accessed October 18, 2009). 
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universities are often instrumental in facilitating ties.16 There is a regional emphasis for 
example, Yunnan University in southern China has facilitated the establishment of a CI 
in Bangladesh (North-South University Dhaka), and Lanzhou University in China’s 
north-western Gansu province has sponsored CIs in Central Asian countries. Likewise 
Auckland University has established a CI with Fudan University in its sister-city of 
Shanghai. In a few cases one Chinese university (such as Beijing University of Foreign 
Languages) may be involved in setting up more than a dozen CIs, but in the majority of 
cases each university may only be responsible for managing one CI in one or two 
foreign countries. 
CIs do not teach Confucian philosophy, but use his image to promote Chinese language 
and culture. Confucius is the Latinised form of Kongzi, who was a statesman, 
philosopher and educator who lived 550-476 B.C. during a transitional period when 
China developed from a slave society to a feudal society. 17 The philosophy he 
developed stands for order, hierarchy and tradition.18 Confucius maintained that only if 
the nation’s men conformed to correct rules of conduct can social order be maintained, 
and the correct adherence to rites signifies commitment and deference to authority. 
While radical intellectuals have criticised him because his doctrines stand in opposition 
to ideologies of change, on the other hand, Confucius has also been useful to those in 
authority,19 and he, and his teachings, are currently experiencing a revival of interest in 
China.20
Literature review
Although the CIs have only been in operation since 2004, they are already the specific 
subject of several studies, and other literature discusses them in the context of related 
subjects such as modern Chinese foreign policy and diplomacy. Jocelyn Chey’s study21
highlights concerns about the CIs threatening academic independence and suggests that 
  
16 Xiaolin Guo Repackaging Confucius: PRC Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power Institute for Security and 
Development Policy,  http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/ap/08/xg08repackagingconfucius.pdf (Accessed 
January 4, 2009). p. 31.
17 Tong Zhang and Barry Schwartz, "Confucius and the Cultural Revolution: A Study in Collective Memory," 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 11, no. 2 (1997) p. 193.
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Daniel Bell, "From Marx to Confucius: Changing Discourses on China’s Political Future." Dissent
http://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/?article=767  (Accessed June 12, 2008).
21 Jocelyn Chey, "Chinese "Soft Power" Cultural Diplomacy and the Confucius Institutes," The Sydney Papers 20, 
no. 1 (2008).
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they could be a propaganda tool for the CCP. While in contrast, Don Starr states that 
many of the foreigners working with the CIs have a relaxed view of such issues, but are 
more concerned about long-term administrative issues such as financial viability.22
James Paradise writes that the CIs are part of Chinese attempts to win international 
support for its development, rather than more subversive intentions.23 Some authors
such as Starr argue the CIs mark a new era in Chinese foreign relations and describe
their establishment in 2004 as beginning a “new phase in China’s political self-
confidence,” 24 while Guo describes the CIs as part of a major Chinese effort in 
international image management.25
Since the mid-1990s, China has been adopting a new, more cooperative and more 
effective foreign policy than at any time in the history of the People’s Republic. Several 
recent studies of China’s foreign policy since the rise of a fourth generation of Chinese 
leaders, note a distinct change in both the processes,26 and the outcomes.27 They point 
to a savvier and more effective China in international relations in the 21st century, one 
that wants to be a great power, but needs stability in the world system to continue its 
growth. Joshua Kurlantzick sounds a note of alarm with his book “Charm Offensive,” 
in which he argues China’s new foreign policies are subtly winning friends and 
changing the world.28
Power is a central concept in the study of politics, and international relations theory that 
recognises less tangible sources of power such as influence, rather than the traditional 
realist focus on the coercive aspects power, form the viewpoint on which this thesis is 
based. “Soft Power” as it is described by Joseph Nye,29 contrasts with the “hard power” 
of military and economic aspects of power, and relates to the ability to get people to do 
what you want them to do through influence and attraction rather than through force.
The concept has been used in both Chinese and foreign discussion of the CIs. The role 
  
22 Starr, "Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes."
23 James F. Paradise, "China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's 
Soft Power," Asian Survey 49, no. 4 (2009). p. 662.
24 Starr, "Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes,"   p. 1.
25 Xiaolin Guo, Repackaging Confucius: PRC Diplomacy and the Rise of Soft Power Institute for Security and 
Development Policy,  http://www.isdp.eu/files/publications/ap/08/xg08repackagingconfucius.pdf
26 Bonnie  Glaser and Evan  Medeiros, "The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in China: The 
Ascension and Demise of the Theory of Peaceful Rise?," The China Quarterly 190, no. -1 (2007).
27 Evan Medeiros and Taylor Fravel, "China's New Diplomacy," Foreign Affairs 82, no. 6 (2003).
28 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World (Binghamton, New 
York  Vail-Ballou Press 2007).
29Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics (Cambridge, MA  Public Affairs, 2004).
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of cultures in world politics in addition to state actors, is receiving more recognition in 
the contemporary era of globalisation, and Sheng Ding has described how Chinese 
attempts in promoting the Chinese language and culture form a major part of recent 
attempts to gain soft power.30 He argues that such an approach to diplomacy has been 
embedded in Chinese foreign relations for centuries. 
Many factors, such as the recent “war on terror,” have led to increased interest in how 
international actors can strategically influence foreign public opinion. This requires less 
coercion through military and economic forces, and more persuasive publicity (or 
propaganda) tactics. Nicholas Cull has sought to categorise the various government 
activities to influence foreign audiences, such as broadcasting, exchanges and cultural 
programmes, into the relatively new term “public diplomacy.”31 While China’s re-
emergence as an economic power is widely recognised, Ingrid d’Hooghe discusses the 
rapid rise of China’s public diplomacy activities which aim to improve its soft power.32
An assessment of China’s soft power is that it is rapidly growing through a series of 
measures aiming to woo the world through subtle means.33
In order to discuss the political influences on the CIs it is necessary to consider China’s 
Party-State system. Kenneth Lieberthal, in Governing China,34 notes the reforms in 
China’s political system, and discusses the picture from the outside and the quite 
different internal functioning of authority. Since 1949, China has moved from 
totalitarianism to authoritarianism in which the CCP dominates political decision 
making. One study by Anne-Marie Brady,35 discusses the institutions of the Party’s
propaganda system with its domestic and external spheres, arguing that they are central 
to the Party’s sophisticated attempts to manage power.
A consensus among several authors is that China’s soft power drive through the CIs 
may lack effectiveness. James Paradise argues that China may find it easier to win 
  
30 Ding and Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of 
the Chinese Language."
31Nicholas Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," American Academy of Political and Social 
Science, no. 616 (2008).
32 Ingrid d'Hooghe The Rise of China's Public Diplomacy Netherlands Institute of International Relations,  
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2007/20070700_cdsp_paper_hooghe.pdf (Accessed October 1, 2009).
33 Kurlantzick, Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power is Transforming the World.
34 Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform, 2nd ed. (New York  W.W. Norton, 
2005).
35 Ibid.
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friends in developing countries with whom it shares political values.36 Ding concludes 
that current Chinese efforts, while raising China’s soft power, are limited by the lack of 
attractiveness of the CCP’s record of governance.37 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang 
agree that China’s international influence is increasing, but measures such as the CIs
will lack effectiveness due to the lack of attractiveness of its political system. 38 They 
argue that China should be encouraged where its efforts coincide with international 
norms. 
What isn’t known
A historical discussion is necessary to background past foreign relations of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and efforts to promote the teaching of the Chinese language to 
foreigners. To this extent, a central question this thesis will address is the extent to 
which China’s approach to foreign relations has evolved, especially since the 
foundation of the PRC in 1949 when it pursued an anti-imperialist foreign policy.
Criticism of the CIs has argued that they are a subversive Chinese attempt to influence 
foreign public opinion, and are not analogous to the cultural diplomacy of other nations.
This will be investigated.
International relations theory can provide a lens through which to view China’s 
changing foreign policy and to understand its conceptual sources. One question that will 
be investigated in this area is the theoretical basis for the CIs. If China is moving away 
from Marxism-Leninism as a guide to international relations, the theories it bases its 
new contemporary behaviour on need to be discussed.
The relationship between the culture of the country and the political system from where 
the diplomacy originated is important when culture is used in diplomacy. The third 
question that is not significantly dealt with by existing research is, how independent are 
the CIs from the Chinese political system? Debate about whether the CIs are 
equivalents of European cultural diplomacy like the British Council and the Goethe 
Institute has focused on the degree of political independence which various cultural 
diplomacy programmes have. Margret Wyszomirski has sought to compare the various 
  
36 Paradise, "China and International Harmony: The Role of Confucius Institutes in Bolstering Beijing's Soft 
Power." p. 664.
37 Sheng Ding, The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power (Plymouth, United Kingdom: 
Rowman and Littlefield 2008),  p. 91.
38 Bates Gill and Yanzhong Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'," Survival 48, no. 2 (2006).
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cultural diplomacy programmes of selected nations in a study, 39 but a detailed 
comparison with China is lacking, a gap this study aims to fill. How the CIs are 
governed and financed will indicate the channels of control over them. 
The development of the CIs has been met with concerns in the West that they are a 
threat, however some argue for a more benign assessment. There are some difference
between studies with concerns about the CIs as threats to academic independence,40 and 
those who take a more relaxed view.41 The views of those working with the CIs in 
foreign countries, and their supporters are considered by asking “Are the CIs a tool for 
subversion or a bridge for understanding?”
Thesis statement
This thesis seeks to test the hypothesis that the CIs do constitute a major change in 
China’s foreign policy. Although they appear to be a goodwill gesture to promote 
Chinese language and culture, they are actually part of a strategy to manage China’s 
international image, and to assist its rise to become a great power. An evolution in 
China’s foreign policy from belligerence and self-sufficiency during the Cold War, to 
confidence and engagement in the era of globalisation, is apparent. The CIs appear to 
have a high degree of political independence, but functionally have a complex
relationship with China’s Party-State system. The CIs may detract from the academic 
independence of learning institutions, but also contribute to the institutions achieving 
their goals; particularly those that seek to expand Chinese language teaching 
capabilities in their communities. The CIs are likely to grow and contribute to the 
growth of Chinese as a world language. However, the China’s goal of growing its soft 
power may lack effectiveness due to the negative international image of China’s 
political system. 
Why are these issues important?
While China’s rise as an economic and military power receives much attention, the 
ability to influence the minds of the world, is also an aspect of China’s growing power 
that deserves attention. Military and economic factors continue to be important sources 
  
39 Margaret J.  Wyszomirski, Christopher  Burgess, and Catherine  Peila International Cultural Relations: A Multi-
Country Comparison Arts International, Center for Arts and Culture,  
http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MJWpaper.pdf (Accessed 26 February 2009).
40 Chey, "Chinese "Soft Power" Cultural Diplomacy and the Confucius Institutes." p. 44.
41 Starr, "Chinese Language Education in Europe: the Confucius Institutes." p. 79.
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of national power in international relations, but less tangible aspects of power such as 
the ability to influence the agenda of public discussion, are becoming better  
understood. One of the main manifestations of globalisation has been cultural fluidity, 
and factors such as culture, education, skills and ideology have become more important 
than natural resources, geography and population in the contemporary era of 
globalisation.42 Although military capability and economic resources are still important 
factors in a state’s national power, persuasion - getting people to want the policy 
outcomes that you want, is becoming a more effective means of achieving one’s goals
than coercing them.43
Many nations are developing programmes influenced by marketing and public relations 
theory directed at foreign audiences by harnessing the power of their culture, domestic 
values and policies to achieve foreign policy goals. Because of the relative intangibility 
of the power of influence as opposed to coercive capability, China’s soft power 
activities are less obvious. 44 Sheng Ding describes China’s soft power activities,
especially the global promotion of the Chinese language, with the title of his book; “The 
Dragon’s Hidden Wings.”45
China has undergone different eras in its foreign relations since the revolution in 1949, 
and a significant transformation has been apparent since the early 1990s. The need to 
develop China and adapt to the era of globalisation has required the adoption of new 
policies. According to a recent study the CCP is seeking to extend and strengthen its 
rule over China,46 a task made more challenging given the information revolution and 
spread of democracy. The CCP severely attacked Confucianism as an “old idea” during 
the Mao era, so it is a considerable change for it to be using the image of Confucius at 
the forefront of this world-wide programme. The CCP may be seeking to introduce its 
version of Chinese language and culture on the world, but China may become 
influenced by global values in the process. The engagement process could lead to major 
  
42 Ding and Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion of 
the Chinese Language,"   p. 10.
43 Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics. p. 2.
44 Gill and Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'," p. 32.
45 Sheng Ding, The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power (Plymouth, United Kingdom  
Rowman and Littlefield 2008).
46 Anne-Marie Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China (Lanham, 
Maryland  Rowman and Littlefield, 2008). p. 2.
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changes to China itself, as foreigners who speak the Chinese language participate in 
China’s social discourse.
There is debate whether the CIs are neutral and scholarly institutions, or an attempt by 
the CCP to control what people know about China (as one Chinese dissident47 has
stated). The CIs are growing rapidly, and there will be 500 by 2010 according to 
projections.48 China has a different political history than the existing powerful states, 
and is less tolerant of dissent than developed democracies, so it is important to 
understand how the CIs will handle persons and groups that have a different point of 
view to the CCP. A question worth asking is whether the CIs are a gift horse or a Trojan 
horse?
Research sources  
The sources of this qualitative study consisted of at least 200 separate items, including
academic journal articles and texts, as well as reports, web sources and oral interviews 
with China studies specialists. Primary research into the opinions of directors of 
Confucius Institutes to criticism of the CIs relating to academic freedom and political 
independence was attempted, but it was not possible to obtain responses from a 
representative sample. A list of 10 questions was formulated, and 122 subjects were 
contacted (half the CIs existing at the time), with 19 replies or 15.6 % of the sample 
(and 7% of the total CIs) being received. The low sample of the total CIs diminished the 
scientific reliability of the results. Nevertheless, the results of this primary research (not 
replicated elsewhere at the time) offers an insight into the perspective of some 
individual CI directors. A field trip to the CI at Auckland University in August 2008, 
enabled first-hand observation, and interviews with staff.
Thesis outline
This Introduction contains a background of what is known about the subject from
existing research, a discussion of what is not known, why it is important, and the 
methodology of my study. Chapter Two observes that China has used its vast cultural 
resources to influence foreigners and assimilate neighbouring societies in the ancient 
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past.49 Since 1949, China had a belligerent and diplomatically isolated relationship with 
many developed democracies, but in practise sought to influence matters it saw as 
important from behind the scenes. However, this began to change with reform and open 
policies from 1978. China’s international behaviour is evolving with much savvier and 
more effective diplomacy that still seeks to achieve great power (but not hegemonic) 
status. This chapter argues that the CIs represent an expansion of Chinese language 
teaching efforts to foreigners, and they also represent a change in the goals and tactics 
of Chinese foreign policy. 
Chapter Three discusses theories relevant to this study that help us understand power, 
culture and diplomacy in the contemporary world. The conceptual bases of CCP foreign 
policy have broadened from Marxism-Leninism to include contemporary global values 
and traditional Chinese concepts (such as harmony). International relations theories 
such as Neoliberalism, argue that while military capabilities, natural resources and 
geography have been important in the past, in the contemporary era, national power is 
increasingly made up by factors such as institutions, education, technology and
influence. Culture has also become recognised as an important factor in international 
relations, on both the behaviour of states and on their domestic politics. The proponents 
of the theories of soft power and public diplomacy argue that both will be increasingly 
important and contested in the globalised era, and these have been adopted into China’s 
foreign policy. Other nations have language institutes that are similar to the CIs as part 
of their cultural diplomacy, which is one aspect of a public diplomacy strategy.
Chapter Four considers the independence of the CIs from the Chinese political system. 
The language institutes operating as part of the cultural diplomacy of other nations are 
found on comparison, to all have some form of connection to the political systems they 
represent. Ostensibly the CIs are governed by representatives from China’s state 
bureaucracy and foreign partners, but in the Chinese political system, the Party 
dominates, and tends to conceal the extent of its deep influence. Through various 
mechanisms such as appointing Party officials to state positions, and hidden 
bureaucratic networks, the Party ensures that its priorities are carried out. Propaganda is 
an important source of legitimacy for the Party, and the CIs are part of this system that 
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is directed at external audiences. However, the guidance on the CIs from the CCP is 
compromised with influence from the foreign partners.
Chapter Five details the concerns expressed about the CIs. The concerns that they are a 
threat to academic independence and a form of political influence have some validity, 
however, many of those working with CIs are concerned less about such issues, but 
rather are more concerned with their long-term viability and financial stability. For 
some universities (especially those with a high academic ranking) the costs of hosting a 
CI are too high, but for many others the benefits outweigh the negatives. Academic 
independence is a relative term, and is one of the many factors learning institutions can 
take into account when deciding whether a CI would assist in achieving the institutions 
goals. It is generally accepted that the CIs do amount to a form of soft power directed at 
influencing foreign public opinion to form positive views about a rising China, and 
there is a need to see them as such, and recognise that other nations are also involved in 
similar activities.
Chapter Six concludes that China is growing in international influence because of the 
modernisation of its diplomacy aimed at influencing foreign public opinion. The CIs 
form a major part of this strategy and will grow larger in the future. However they are 
likely to be less effective because China’s efforts fail to address the international image 
of the CCP’s poor record of political governance. Nevertheless, China’s moves towards
internationally accepted values of international relations allow greater opportunities for 
engagement.
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to provide a better understanding of the CIs and the
role they play in China’s engagement with the rest of the world. The CIs can be better 
understood by an examination of the history and conceptual sources of China’s foreign 
relations. Although the CCP remains in power, it has moved away from its socialist 
origins, and a new hybrid model is emerging which combines Marxism-Leninism, 
traditional Chinese values (such as Confucianism) and contemporary international 
values. China has opened up to the world more, but new forms of Party political 
influence are emerging that emphasise persuasion rather than coercion. In short, China 
is relating to the rest of the world in a way that much more effectively maximises its 
interests without disrupting the world system. The CIs are a useful component of 
China’s international cultural diplomacy, and while they are likely to be restricted in 
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their effectiveness, they reflect a large and diverse nation gaining more confidence in its
relationship with the rest of the world in the 21st century, than has been seen in the last 
century.
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Chapter Two 
FROM EXPORTING REVOLUTION TO EXPORTING 
CULTURE 
Introduction 
Contemporary China is deploying a new foreign policy that is markedly different in 
scope and tactics to those deployed by the People’s Republic 60 years ago. This chapter 
seeks to answer the question “To what extent has Chinese foreign policy and teaching 
of the Chinese language to foreigners changed since 1949?” As China has transformed 
from a weak economic position in the mid 20th century, to be one of the major global 
economic powers of the 21st century, its approach to the international system has also 
transformed. During the Mao era China adopted economic self-sufficiency and a 
revolutionary socialist path which won it few friends in the West. However, a less 
ideological and more pragmatic approach emerged under Deng from 1978, which saw 
gradually expanding ties with former ideological enemies and rapid economic 
development within China. The current fourth generation of Chinese communist leaders 
have developed a strategy that seeks to maintain a stable world system in which China 
can both grow, and maintain favourable domestic conditions. Since 2002, China’s new 
foreign diplomacy has become more engaged and cooperative than at any time in its 
history.
The CIs are part of a new package of measures aimed at promoting Chinese culture to 
foreigners, and reassuring the world that China’s re-emergence will be peaceful. In this 
sense, the CIs are representative of the fundamental changes in thinking and behaviour 
towards foreign relations by China’s leaders, however they retain some distinctive 
features that have not changed. This chapter will outline eras in China’s foreign 
relations, a history of China’s promotion of the Chinese language to foreigners and the 
apparent revival of Confucianism in China. 
Throughout the periods of confrontation and engagement, Chinese leaders have been 
seeking to maintain the country’s security. According to Denny Roy Beijing has had 
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three enduring foreign policy goals; wealth, power and status.50 Power is described as 
the ability to influence other governments to positions that China favours, wealth 
equates to an improved standard of living for Chinese citizens, and status describes 
increasing international respect for China.51 China is striving to retain its position in the 
world as a great power, and recently its foreign affairs behaviour has become more 
about developing its economic interests than trying to make its own path towards 
socialist utopia. The establishment of the CIs in 2004 represents an attempt to harness 
the enduring image of Confucius as a cultural icon, and the prominence given to 
Confucianism within China marks the development of a new nationalism which 
incorporates traditional values.
Foreign affairs behaviour
Traditional Chinese values (including Confucianism and Taoism) have played an 
important role in the evolution of China’s international behaviour. Chinese classical 
thinkers placed less emphasis on the use of force as a means of maintaining social and 
political order, and this extended to inter-state affairs, - which contrasts with European 
intellectuals Machiavelli and Hobbes who emphasized that war was absolutely 
necessary to bring about order and stability.52 Another central tenant was the Confucian 
view of foreign policy that leaders should lead by moral example and promote social 
harmony.53 Ancient Chinese strategists preferred diplomatic manoeuvring over military 
confrontation and these patterns continue to influence modern day foreign relations.54
CCP and foreign affairs
The CCP has traditionally had an extremely broad view of external relations that gave it 
the ability to manage all aspects of China’s relations with the rest of the world. Policies 
that determined China’s state to state relations, Chinese people’s relations with 
individual foreigners, and what foreigners could do in China, were all covered by the 
term waishi, which can be loosely translated as “foreign affairs”. It is a much broader 
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view of foreign affairs than a Western definition, and includes state-to-state relations, 
people-to-people diplomacy, foreign propaganda and the promotion of foreign friends.55
In addition to the broad view of foreign relations, a wide-ranging system encompassing 
many organisations has been developed to manage it. The waishi system reflects the 
CCP desire to manage China’s relationship with the rest of the world and it continues 
with CCP rule.
The Mao era
Mao’s path of development for China meant strong relations with socialist nations and 
relatively weak relations with the West during the 1949-1978 period. Having fought a 
bitter war of against Japan and a divisive civil war against the Nationalists, the CCP’s 
foreign policy under Zhou Enlai sought to gain political independence and national 
security in China’s relations with the rest of the world. Zhou and Mao created a foreign 
policy that was influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology and was not averse to 
becoming militarily involved in Cold War conflicts, such as in Korea in the early 1950s. 
China leaned to the side of the Soviet Union from 1949 to the early 1960s, and its 
belligerent attitude towards the West and support for insurgencies created disdain for 
China and difficulties for ethnic Chinese living abroad. A lean toward the Soviet Union 
was evident in the foreign policy orientation of China’s international relations between 
1959 and the early 1960s. After disputes with the Soviet Union in the 1960s, China 
leant to the centre between the US and USSR, and aligned itself with the developing 
world.56
During this period Chinese diplomats were ideologically rigid and ineffective with the 
result that Chinese foreign policies made few friends. China’s foreign relations in this 
period were also marked by relative isolation from international organisations, and 
economic self-sufficiency.57 As the country was racked by internal turmoil during the 
Cultural Revolution from 1966-76 it withdrew further from the world system and at one 
stage in 1968 had only one ambassador stationed abroad, in Egypt.58 During the turmoil  
corpses were discovered floating down the Pearl River into Hong Kong harbour, and 
some foreign embassies were attacked, which resulted in nations withdrawing their 
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ambassadors from Beijing. The international image of Mao’s China was largely 
negative and from the perspective of many of its neighbouring countries and the much 
Western world, it was a dangerous and unpredictable country and its foreign policy did 
not have any attractiveness at all.59 The promotion of so-called “liberation movements” 
in states involved in civil wars was part of a policy of “exporting revolution” which was 
designed to support the freedom of oppressed peoples.60 However many developed 
nations found these actions deeply threatening, and the results of the civil wars were 
often inconclusive for Beijing. During the Cultural Revolution from 1966-76 China was 
preoccupied by domestic developments and designing a coherent foreign policy was 
downgraded on the agenda for the country.61
An important model for Chinese conduct in foreign relations was the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence agreed on with other developing nations in 1954. It emphasised 
“non-interference in internal affairs” of other nations, (however in practise China often 
worked quietly behind the scenes to resolve problems).62 This statement remains an 
important influence on Chinese foreign policy. Early foreign policy under Mao, 
regarded the world as in transition from capitalism to communism, and emphasised 
self-reliance to avoid vulnerability created by international trade. The evolution of 
Chinese foreign relations within the Mao era involved China moving gradually from 
being a close ally of the Soviet Union, to a more independent international stance, and 
towards improving relations with the United States. 
Personalised foreign relations
China has developed a distinctive tendency to personalise international relations.63 This 
emerged as one way to conduct diplomacy because early in the CCP’s rule, the country 
was diplomatically isolated. From the founding of the People’s Republic of China in 
1949 to recent times, all its senior leaders have made statements describing China’s 
external relations as “half state-to-state diplomacy and half people’s diplomacy.”64 This 
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distinctive approach has been described as neither cultural diplomacy as it is usually 
defined, nor a simple name for standard diplomatic practice, but is a “remarkably 
effective approach for dealing with the outside world.” 65 The CCP’s “friendship 
diplomacy” has focused on breaking out of diplomatic isolation, attempting to influence 
public opinion in the West, splitting power blocs opposed to the China,  creating 
symbolic solidarity with the people of the world, and affirming China’s global status.66
This distinctive diplomacy was based on foreign friends and friendship organisations
and is of some similarity to the CIs of the 21st century. 
People to people diplomacy, despite its name, does not involve ordinary Chinese 
citizens becoming diplomats, but rather means that the government uses a wide range of 
“officially nonofficial” contacts with other countries to expand its influence.67 In 1954 
the Chinese People’s Association for Friendship with Foreign Countries (CPAFFC) was 
set up to improve China’s image and to facilitate non-official contact between people of 
other countries. The first ‘friendship association’ was the Sino-Soviet Friendship 
Association. Such ‘friendship organisations’, ‘ping-pong diplomacy’ (where ping-pong 
teams were exchanged with the United States in the early 1970s), and people’s 
exchanges with developing countries were hallmarks of Chinese attempts to break out 
of diplomatic isolation during the Cold War. 
Post 1978: The Reform and Open era
China’s foreign policy radicalism was adjusted and even reversed under the post-Mao 
leadership, which adopted a policy of being more open to the rest of the world, and 
promoting security through national development. Deng Xiaoping took China in the 
direction of engagement with the international community with the aim of promoting 
economic modernisation. China gradually reduced support for revolutionary 
movements, and in 1979 ended its war with Vietnam, factors which improved ties with 
many countries. Economic development took priority over promoting ideology as the 
country urgently needed the assistance of foreign technology and investment to speed 
up its modernisation process.68 Foreign propaganda was still regarded as an essential 
  
65 Ibid. p.23.
66 Ibid.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid. p.191.
28
part of China's modernization process and would now aim to "overcome foreign 
suspicions” and “suit foreign tastes” rather than praising Mao.69
The economic reform era ushered in by Deng Xiaoping encouraged more specialisation 
and professionalism in China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Improving ties with 
other countries resulted in more ambassadors being appointed who have mainly been 
career diplomats rather than former military officers, and a new recruitment policy for 
the MFA which resulted in a staff pool who were committed to reforms.70 Changes 
resulted in a reworking of the diplomatic process, in favour of flexibility and 
adaptation.71
Deng’s policies ushered in a new era of being more open to the outside world, while 
retaining the CCP’s dominance in domestic politics. His policies encouraged foreign 
trade and investment, and China began sending students to Western universities. 
Additionally, Chinese writers and journalists were encouraged to set up joint ventures 
with foreign television, radio and film groups.72 Cultural, educational and sporting 
exchange visits became useful for promoting understanding of a Chinese perspective, 
and likewise understanding Western attitudes. These measures led to an enthusiasm 
about China moving to rapid political reform by some members of Chinese society, 
especially students, which tragically proved premature. 
“Lying Low”
In June 1989, the Chinese leadership violently suppressed a pro-democracy movement 
that had raised international hope of further political liberalisation. These events were 
also a traumatic upheaval for the Chinese ruling elite. The resulting bloodshed caused 
major damage to China’s international image with the result that many Western 
countries downgraded economic ties with China, and while Deng’s leadership survived, 
China’s economic development was threatened. Chinese leaders searched for a way out 
of the situation, and Deng persuaded elites that economic reform and openness would 
continue without change to the political system, but increased emphasis needed to be 
placed on conveying the messages of the leadership to the public, both domestically and
externally. He used the term “seize with both hands, and both hands must be strong” to 
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describe how the central leadership would ensure stability by tightly  managing two 
aspects: the economy and the propaganda system.73
As a result of the isolation experienced by China in the wake of the crushing of the pro-
democracy movement, China adopted a strategy of “lying low” in international 
affairs.74 Deng stressed the need to maintain relationships with those nations that held 
misgivings about China, and while the West continued to be perceived as hostile, 
neighbouring Asian nations became the focus of attention. 75 Also, the leadership 
urgently underwent a change in its model of communicating its message to domestic 
and foreign audiences. In November 1989, new leader Jiang Zemin reminded elites that 
Party policy stated that in a socialist society, all aspects, including culture were part of 
the ideological sphere that must be managed in the interests of the people.76
Following the June 1989 turmoil the CCP was further shaken by the collapse of 
communism in East European countries and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1989-
1991. As a result of the latter, the CCP underwent a comprehensive process of self-
examination of what had gone wrong in the birthplace of Marxism-Leninism, and what 
it needed to do to avoid the same fate. Chinese assessments were conducted by 
numerous research organisations such as the Central Party School, and looked at 
systematic causes as compared to Western analyses which tended to focus on 
immediate causes. 77 The assessments indicated that if the CCP did not undergo 
significant reform it would go the same way as the other communist regimes. 
Failings identified from the fall of European communism were described in Chinese 
assessments as; economic stagnation due to the command economic system, totalitarian 
leadership leading to terror among the population, poor ideological discipline and 
peaceful undermining of the system from the West.78 During the 1990s, the reports 
found that the CCP needed to improve economic fundamentals, provide its citizens with 
opportunities to improve their standard of living, and improve the legitimacy of the 
Party among the population. This began an urgent process whereby considerable effort 
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was devoted to developing China’s market economy, improving the communication of 
the Party’s ideological message, and increasing inner-Party democracy. For example, an 
extensive process was undertaken whereby corrupt Party members were dismissed, 
Party educational standards were increased and the commitment of members to 
ideological fundamentals was tested.79
The Party also recognised it needed to improve its communication with foreign publics. 
The CCP’s reforms have been fundamental in scope and belie the general image in the 
West that there has been no political reform in China since 1989, and that the Chinese 
system will inevitably succumb to the march of democracy.80 Chinese leaders began to 
adapt their ideology, and more effective means were devoted to managing information 
and the media. Following the June 1989 disturbances, senior propagandist Zhu Muzhi 
noted a peak of anti-China sentiment in Western media, and urged China to “step up the 
battle for world public opinion”.81 A 1998 propaganda booklet for Chinese officials 
argued that Western powers were using powerful tools of propaganda and public 
opinion to denigrate China’s image on issues such as human rights, and China needed 
to adopt new measures to combat this.82
During the 1990s China sought to rebuild its international image through more effective 
diplomacy. Chinese foreign policy debates began to involve a wider range of 
contributors, and even a more public dimension.83 Analysts and officials began to 
realise that coercive actions such as seizing the Mischief Reef in 1995, and military 
exercises in the Taiwan Straight in the mid-1990s raised concerns among China’s 
neighbours and hampered other foreign affairs goals such as repatriating Hong Kong. 
As a result Chinese leaders attempted to address these concerns by adjusting China’s 
regional diplomacy to focus more on engagement, confidence building exercises and 
reassurance.84
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China’s “peaceful rise”
As China has begun to make economic gains, it has begun to play a greater role in 
international affairs, and has sought to reassure the rest of the world, that its rise as a 
global power will be peaceful. China’s re-emergence as an economic power has been 
accompanied by concerns that it will be a threat to existing powers and the rest of the 
world, and Chinese elites have become more aware of the damage negative 
international public image can have on the drive for economic development and 
stability. In 2003, the “peaceful rise” (heping jueqi) theory promoted by Party theorist 
Zheng Bijian became influential. He identified pervasive uncertainty and polarized 
views in the United States about China’s future, that had the potential to further 
complicate US-China relations, and undermine Beijing’s pursuit of great power status.85
Peaceful rise holds that the process of raising the living standards of the Chinese people 
can be achieved without destabilizing the international order or oppressing its 
neighbours. 86 Zheng advocated promoting Chinese culture abroad as a means of 
overcoming hostility towards communism and negative images created by the 
behaviour of Chinese citizens abroad.87
The peaceful rise strategy regards a peaceful world environment as essential for China’s 
deep social, economic and political reform.88 Beijing has sought to promote good 
relations wherever it has a strategic interest, which has meant aligning itself with 
developed as well as developing nations. Regional conferences organised by China in 
Africa in 2007 and the Pacific in 2006 have provided these regions with alternatives to 
economic assistance packages offered by other developed nations and generate new 
political allegiances. After three years of using the term peaceful rise, Chinese leaders 
are using the term less, in favour of “peaceful development” which fundamentally seeks 
to serve the same purpose of reassuring the rest of the world, while giving China more 
flexibility in such fields as military modernisation and deterring Taiwanese 
independence.89 The peaceful development strategy forms part of the foreign policy 
platform of President Hu Jintao who became President in 2003. While economic 
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diplomacy – the practise of promoting commerce - remains low key, cultural diplomacy 
has shifted into top gear in 2008, and the targeting foreign publics remains a top 
priority.90
Result of the evolution: China as an active international player
In recent years China has emerged as an active player in the international arena, taking 
a less confrontational, more sophisticated, more confident and sometimes, a more 
constructive approach to regional and global affairs.91 Citing Chinese steps to promote a 
settlement of the North Korean nuclear issue which involved threatening its former 
close ally North Korea, a Foreign Affairs article stated that the measures amounted to a 
“stark departure” from Chinese passivity and buck-passing on the issue.92 The changes 
have included expanding the depth of its bilateral relationships, deepening participation 
in key multilateral organisations, and playing an active part in resolving international 
security issues. Some foreign strategists are sceptical of these changes arguing that 
China still tries to maximise its interests at the expense of others, and stakes a claim to 
the moral high ground while riding on the actions of other major powers. 93 An 
undeniable reality however, cannot be ignored; since the mid 1990s, China’s foreign 
policy has become far more nimble and engaging that at any other time in its history.94
China’s current foreign policy can be described as one of “balance”. It involves 
balancing the lying low policy of Deng with the great power ambitions of Jiang, playing 
one country or power bloc after another with the aim of establishing a multi-polar 
world, and balancing the socialist goal of third world friendship with the imperatives of
securing national development and becoming a member of the first world.95 Kurlantzick 
describes China’s contemporary goals as including maintaining the stability of its 
borders, portraying itself as a constructive actor, isolating Taiwan, becoming a model to 
other nations and demonstrating the possibility that it can become a great power.96
Outlining the countries diplomatic priorities for 2009, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang 
Jiechi stated that the over-arching objective was ensuring steady economic development 
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in China, while safeguarding China’s territorial and security interests, pursuing cultural 
diplomacy, and strengthening the rights and interests of Chinese nationals abroad.97
However, according to Sheng Ding, many analysts believe China’s real objective is to 
maximise its power and influence at regional and global levels or as Jiang Zemin stated 
to “increase China’s national greatness”.98
Historical suspicions of China, particularly in Asia, may also be an obstacle to China 
achieving its goals of peaceful development. For many South-East Asian countries the 
chance of Chinese influence raising local Chinese consciousness in their own 
communities is a cause of concern. 99 In Japan, Chinese culture has had a major 
influence, but the relationship has become more complicated in recent years. In the eyes 
of many Japanese, China has lost its moral standing due to Beijing’s criticism of 
Tokyo’s attitude towards the history of World War II and demands for humiliating 
apologies for past offenses. 100 Despite this, the Chinese language is becoming an 
important language in many parts of Asia.
China is undergoing rapid development in its diplomacy and has selectively adopted 
contemporary diplomatic tools of influence in the economic and cultural fields. Joshua 
Kurlantzick describes Chinese use of foreign economic assistance, and the promotion of 
Chinese culture to foreign audiences as a “charm offensive.”101 Not only has Beijing 
adjusted the strategic perspective of its foreign policy, but it also has put many new 
initiatives in place. 102 In a short time, Beijing has adopted a systematic coherent 
strategy and a set of tools to implement it. These include assisting Chinese businesses 
abroad, improved foreign broadcasting, more effective media briefings, assistance for 
student exchanges and the promotion of the Chinese culture and language abroad. 
Through these measures, China has increased its influence, but many nations have not 
recognised the downsides such as the export of China’s domestic problems. China’s 
state-centred model of development and lack of political transparency are strengthening 
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authoritarian regimes and undermining attempts to promote better governance.103 The 
changes have been subtle and slow, but their significance for the rest of the world is 
immense.104
Chinese language promotion to foreigners
As part of its new diplomacy, China has put more effort into promoting its language 
internationally. Efforts to promote the learning of the Chinese language by foreign non-
native speakers have been in existence since the CCP came to power in 1949. Initial 
efforts focused on the Soviet bloc of countries. In 1950 Tsinghua University in Beijing 
instituted an exchange for Eastern European students to study the Chinese language as a 
foreign language, and in 1962, the Higher Preparatory School for Foreign students was 
set up, becoming the Beijing Languages Institute, a base for teaching Chinese as a 
foreign language.105 In the early 1960s China sent a number of language teachers to 
Egypt, Mali, Congo, Cambodia, Yemen and France, but during the Cultural Revolution 
(1966-1976) many international activities diminished and the Beijing Languages 
Institute was closed down and foreign students returned home. However, towards the 
end of the Cultural Revolution in the early 1970s cultural and sporting exchanges such 
as those with the US began to improve. Visitors in the form of foreign scholars from 
Western countries were permitted from the early 1970s, with many of the individuals 
involved going on to careers as specialist China scholars outside China.
After the 1978 reform and opening up policies began, teaching Chinese as a foreign 
language underwent a new stage of development, even though China had been actively 
promoting cultural exchanges with many countries for several years. The third-world 
countries had been traditional cultural exchange partners, but cultural exchanges began 
to increase with other countries also. Language policies such as encouraging the 
speaking of English within China and teaching the Chinese language to foreigners, 
especially in Western countries, aimed to reduce the language barriers faced by 
international investors and to attract foreign capital. Supporters of this strategy argued 
that foreigners who invest time in learning the Chinese language were likely to 
“establish normal, long-lasting relationships with [China] and they will develop a 
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special feeling, ganqing [towards China]. This will be very useful in the long run.”106 In 
July 1987, China’s State Council, in conjunction with the Ministry of Education, the 
Beijing Languages Institute and other state departments, set up the National Office for 
Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (known as Hanban). 
Since its establishment, Hanban has launched many campaigns to reach out to the world 
by promoting interest in the Chinese language. In the 1980s the Chinese government 
began to refocus its propaganda activities to promote economic development. China 
opened up to more joint ventures with foreign media companies, as well as with 
journalists and foreign social science researchers.107 One of the results was that Chinese 
universities were able to open themselves to a number of foreign fee-paying students.108
From 1985 China Radio International began to broadcast Chinese language teaching 
programs in a variety of languages, and in 1987 a World Society for the Teaching of 
Chinese was set up.109 The Chinese language proficiency test for non-native speakers, 
Hanyu Shuiping Kaoshi (HSK) was initiated in 1990 as the standardised test of Chinese 
linguistic ability for foreigners and domestic minorities whose mother tongue is a non-
Chinese language.110 In addition, qualifications for teachers of Mandarin to foreigners
were established.111 Foreign locations used for HSK tests began to develop into a 
network.112
The establishment of Chinese cultural centres beginning in the 1980s was an early step 
in Beijing’s cultural promotion activities. The first one was in Mauritius, where a 
Chinese Cultural Centre was established by the Chinese Government in 1989. By 2009 
there were seven, with plans to open five more.113 Rumi Aoyama draws attention to the 
dominant approach of cultural diplomacy between China and Europe, where since the 
early 1990s, China would establish a framework based on inter-governmental 
agreements such as “cultural exchange agreements” to establish cultural exchange 
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centres in each other’s countries. 114 In 1992, Hanban established Chinese cultural 
centres in Russia (in Moscow and St. Petersburg), and later, another such centre was 
established in Kazakhstan. The Chinese Ministry of Education has been cooperating 
with the State of Lower Saxony in Germany since 1997 on the construction of a 
Chinese centre in its state capital Hanover. These cultural centres focused on Chinese 
language promotion, inter-cultural training and special talents training. 115 In 2003, 
cultural festivals and centres were established in exchange with countries such as 
France, Germany and Italy. A increasing feature of China’s cultural activities with 
Europe is that they are carried out under government initiative and on a reciprocal 
basis.116
The Chinese Bridge Project
In October 2004, a decision of the State Council established the CIs with the approval 
of Hanban’s proposed “Chinese Bridge project” (Hanyu qiao), comprising of a package 
of measures to promote the speaking of the Chinese language internationally.117 The 
measures included standardising requirements for teachers of Chinese, expansion of 
HSK language proficiency test locations, improvement of audio visual resources, and 
the establishment of the CIs. Hanban would provide administrative support for the CIs 
and they would be led by Hanban’s Leadership Council of state bureaucracy
representatives. These measures marked an major expansion of activities aimed at 
promoting the teaching of the Chinese language to foreigners. 
After a pilot scheme in Tashkent, Uzbekistan which began in the June 2004, the first 
Confucius Institute was established in Seoul, South Korea in November 2004.118 This 
reflects the importance of neighbouring countries to China which desires peace and 
stability on its borders, and the popularity of the Chinese language in South Korea, 
where it rivals English as the second most spoken language.119 Initially, the goal was for 
100 institutes, but officials appear to have been surprised by the demand as this target 
was achieved within three years, and it was raised upwards to achieve 500 by 2010.
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In December 2007, a CI Leadership Council was created to manage the rapidly growing 
network, replacing the leadership from Hanban. This council consists of a chair, three 
vice-chairs nominated by the State Council, 15 representatives of relevant Chinese 
government departments, 10 committee members who are the chair of the board of a 
foreign CI, and the remaining 5 being positions for Chinese educational partners.120 The 
State Council is the highest authority in the state bureaucratic system, and functions as a 
cabinet, although the highest organisation in China’s political system is the Standing 
Committee of the Politburo of the CCP.121
While the Chinese language is the world’s most widely spoken language, it is likely to 
lag behind Western languages such as English, Spanish and French in terms of 
popularity as a globally accepted means of communication for some time. This is a 
result of the current global structure of cultural power distribution which favours 
nations with systems that are closer to international norms. United States culture is still 
vastly popular in terms of global high and popular culture, and in cinema for example, 
Chinese-language movies’ share of the global box-office was 1.6 percent in recent 
years, compared to 54.2 percent for English-language movies.122
After a century of semi-colonial status and 50 years of third world membership, with 
the establishment of the first CI in Seoul, China was joining a first world club.123 The 
location of the first CI in South Korea reflects the Chinese government’s sense of 
history, as Korea was the last part of China’s traditional cultural empire which was 
forcibly removed by Japan following their 1894-5 war. Korea has a strong affinity with 
Chinese culture and North Korea students were welcomed to China in the 1980s, as 
well as South Koreans who have been enthusiastically taking up opportunities to learn 
the Chinese language. The Chinese characters for China; • • or Zhong guo translate 
as “central state” 124 reflecting the era when China was the source of culture and 
commerce in the world, and was surrounded by tributary states.
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Rejection and rise of Confucianism
China chose Confucius to be the figurehead of its language institute for the association 
with traditional culture in line with some other cultural institutes such as Germany’s 
Goethe Institute, and Russia’s Pushkin Institute. “Confucius” is actually a latinization of 
the Chinese charactersŽ• or Kongzi, and this was translated by the early Catholic 
Missionary Matteo Ricci.125 In fact, Lionel Jensen has argued that what the West knows 
as “Confucius” is quite different to the cultural hero revered by Chinese as Kongzi.126
Kongzi was an itinerant philosopher who lived 551-479 BC when much of China was in 
turmoil and stood for reverence for traditions and respect for authority. 
The wide-ranging ideas of Confucianism have three core features; it was a strongly 
conservative ideology, it valued social hierarchy, and emphasised that people should 
understand the “correct” conduct demanded by each type of relationship. 127 A 
Confucian world view values governance by virtue, where leaders legitimacy is 
established through their superior moral values.128 In this concept, leadership was based 
on meritocracy in which leaders were selected by exams which tested their care and 
understanding of the People, rather than on popular vote. The Confucian concept of 
harmony (he), where an individual accepts their place in the family, society, nation, and 
world is also crucial to the philosophy and has been useful to Chinese leaders. 
However, the Confucian doctrines of self-restraint and conformity stand in opposition 
to ideologies of change and have been criticised by radical intellectuals who favour 
such change.129
During the intellectual movement that sought out new ideas for China following the 
collapse of the Imperial system in 1911, and the popular discontent over the 1919 
Versailles Conference (which handed German concessions in China to Japan), 
Confucianism was subject to heavy criticism. The May Fourth (1919) Movement was 
an intellectual revolution and socio-political reform movement which attacked 
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traditional Confucian ideas and exalted Western ideas, particularly science and 
democracy. The reformers inquiry into liberalism, socialism and nationalism led them 
to criticise Chinese ethics, religion and social and political institutions.130
The CCP was both drawn to and repelled by Confucianism because on the one hand it 
legitimated hegemony and, on the other, it was opposed to revolution. Mao himself 
spent his life fighting the kind of society that Confucianism produced.131 He rejected 
Confucian notions of the absolute value of harmony, and the sense of dependency that 
the resulting hierarchical society nurtured. From 1949 to 1966, the Party undertook 
policies of agricultural “reform” which resulted in land redistribution and massive 
famine, but the Confucian doctrine of asceticism (obtaining a high personal spiritual 
state through self-denial) was useful during this period of indescribable suffering.132
As the Cultural Revolution (1966 to 1976) progressed, attitudes towards Confucius 
became more radical. A campaign was launched by Mao to remove anything “old” and 
replace it with the “new”, in a campaign that resonated with “bourgeois” vs. 
“proletariat”. Traditional Confucian ideals that valued family devotion were attacked as 
preserving the order of slavehood. Initially Confucian ideals were criticised but later
Confucius became history’s greatest villain and every aspect of Confucianism was 
attacked. Although not officially sanctioned, the cultural revolutionaries tried to destroy 
every relic of Confucius such as temples, monuments and sacred texts, to express their 
contempt for the old system’s corruptness.133 When Mao criticised wayward political 
leaders such as Lin Biao it made sense to link them with Confucius, and Mao’s attacks 
on Confucius was also used to deal with critics of his own policies and record.134
As the excesses of the Cultural Revolution led to it being discredited, so did its targets 
begin to be revived, and Confucian prestige rose to a higher level than it had been 
before the Cultural Revolution. In 1976 Mao died and Deng Xiaoping gained power, 
bringing China into a new period of development. The new authority punished the 
“Gang of Four” for their excesses including their attacks on Confucius, restored 
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Confucian shrines damaged by Red Guards, and punished vandals. 135 As China’s 
economy opened up to external trade, many young scholars thought the only way for 
China to survive was to embrace western liberalism, however the regime made a 
conscious effort to merge the traditional with the modern.136 New Confucianists insisted 
that reformed governmental, business and family ethics would preserve tradition as 
China modernised.137  
There has been an increase in Confucian concepts and nationalism in the discourse of 
Chinese leaders both domestically and internationally, and an increase in public interest
in the subject as well. However, China is still an authoritarian society, in which elites 
largely control a linear pattern of political communication.138 The CCP rules through 
control over the administrative machinery, its coercive power, and a pervasive 
campaign of propaganda to condition the public for uniform thinking. This “discursive 
colonisation” gives it the ability to maintain control over a fast-changing society.139 It is 
clear that a revival of popular interest in Chinese traditions is supported by the Party.
Nationalism and Confucian concepts such as harmony have been used to underpin the 
current fourth generation of communist leaders’ policy innovation, and promote 
domestic and global stability. However, with the Chinese system combining a market 
economy and a one-party state resulting in the popular rejection of Marxism-Leninism, 
Confucianism is increasingly being promoted to reduce social tensions and present the 
image of a peaceful, rising China. The Confucian rhetoric of he bu tong (harmonious 
but different) and he wei gui (peace as the ultimate objective), is increasingly being 
used to project a pacifist cultural image to the world which serves as a direct response 
to the “China threat” thesis,140 (which argues that China’s re-emergence should not be 
welcomed because it will be threatening to others). According to Cao, the promotion of 
Confucian concepts in international relations represents a challenge to the established 
international political culture of the 21st century.141
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In contemporary China, Marxism-Leninism is so discredited by its use during the Mao 
era to justify excesses such as the Cultural Revolution that it no longer has significant 
legitimacy in contemporary Chinese society, and the government has encouraged a 
revival of Confucianism as a political model for the future.142 In 1995, for the first time, 
CCP leaders celebrated the 2545th anniversary of the birth of Confucius, and especially 
since the 16th Party Congress in 2002, President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao 
have been stressing an integrated cultural approach to a wide range of issues. In 2003 
Premier Wen Jiabao gave an address at Harvard University where he stated “applying 
he bu tong [harmonious but different] to resolving problems is conducive to treating 
neighbouring countries with civility and leads to a successful resolution of conflict in 
the international community”.143 In other words, he was saying different cultures can 
exist side by side if they respect each other. This offers a defence of China’s model of 
development against the Washington-based model involving economic liberalisation 
and Liberal Democracy.
While there is some debate in China about how to define the county’s contemporary 
culture, Confucianism is a hot topic. Externally China is promoting a “pacifist cultural 
image” in response to the argument that China is a threat.144 However Cao argues that it 
will be a long way to go for the political elite in China to resolve the contradictions 
between the different value systems: Confucian traditions, “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” and democracy and the rule of law.145 However, Bell argues that such is 
the enthusiasm of the uptake of Confucianism, that it provides a direction for 
contemporary China, and it is not impossible that the CCP will be renamed the 
Confucius Party in the future.146
Conclusion
This chapter has considered the evolution of China’s foreign policies and the role that 
this has played in the establishment of the CIs. According to Andrew Nathan and 
Robert Ross, in the 160 years that China was has been involved in the international 
system, its foreign relations have reflected a number of persistent features that include 
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the idea of China as a central state with a self-sufficient civilisation, a tendency to 
encourage others to resolve disputes peacefully, combined with frequent defensive uses 
of force in its neighbourhood, a moralist approach to international relations, skill at 
balancing between other powers and concern about the impact of foreign ties.147
Historically, traditions that emphasise a cultural approach to diplomacy have also
influenced the foreign policies of successive Chinese leaders. To that extent, the CIs are 
a continuation of historical Chinese patterns of international relations. 
Language policies have consistently been used by successive Chinese governments to 
promote national unity and improve literacy. The expansion of Chinese language 
teaching is an example of the continued importance of cultural diplomacy to China’s 
foreign policy, and the CIs represent a major expansion of previous language teaching 
efforts targeted at foreigners. China has been slow to develop Chinese language 
teaching programmes targeted at foreigners and its diaspora compared with Western 
European nations, but coordinated efforts began in the 1980s, and got a kick start with 
the establishment of the CI programme in 2004. The CIs are part of a package of 
measures to harness China’s national language and to promote a positive feeling among 
foreigners over the long term, which is part of a recent policy to promote the civilised 
side of Chinese culture to overcome negative publicity.
It is for good reason that Chinese leaders have chosen to use the image and name of 
Confucius to be new face of Chinese cultural diplomacy. The revival of Confucianism 
has occurred domestically, and the image of Confucius in the CIs represents its 
applicability as a cultural symbol for a new China. Confucianism, which values 
harmony, respect for authority and stability, was promoted at a time of instability in 
traditional China but, it has been denigrated by revolutionaries such as Mao because it 
was seen as standing in opposition to ideologies of radical change. However there has 
been an increase in Confucian discourse in the 21st century, especially among China’s 
leaders who see it as offering a guiding set of values for the contemporary era both 
domestically and internationally. There is a certain discrepancy between the various 
ideological choices China faces including socialism with Chinese characteristics, 
Confucianism and liberal democracy. 
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Chinese foreign policy behaviour has evolved from belligerence and isolation to 
cooperation and engagement. New foreign policy tactics have been devised that are 
flexible rather than rigid, and aim to promote the county’s economic development. In 
the 21st century, China’s foreign policy has evolved into one that is “smarter and more 
sophisticated, but not necessarily kinder or gentler.”148 A package of measures has been 
devised to support China’s growing political influence, and cultural diplomacy 
emphasising Confucius is now a major aspect China’s new foreign relations. The CI 
programme has been appealing to Beijing because it accords with previous Chinese 
approaches to foreign policy that have involved the use of culture to achieve political 
goals. In addition, new factors such as the need to improve China’s international image, 
and the rise of professionalism in its foreign affairs institutions, have paved the way for 
the programme to develop.
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Chapter Three
THEORIES OF POWER, CULTURE AND DIPLOMACY
Introduction
Theories of international relations can provide a framework for understanding general 
patterns underlying seemingly unique events, and provide scholars with a means to 
predict outcomes. This chapter seeks to locate the study of the CIs and Chinese foreign 
policy within international relations theory, and finds that the CIs and China’s “new”
diplomacy149 are the practical expressions of the broadening of the conceptual sources 
of Chinese foreign policy. In liberal academic literature on international relations
theory, there is renewed interest in less tangible forms of power such as leadership, 
institutions and the ability to shape public opinion, – in contrast to realism’s focus on 
coercive military and economic factors. Since 1978, China’s conceptual sources of 
international relations behaviour have broadened from Marxism-Leninism to include 
international norms as well as traditional Chinese values. One example of this is the 
adoption of the theory which recognises new forms of power and strategies aimed at 
influencing foreign public opinion, on which the CIs are based. 
According to Western studies, China’s foreign affairs behaviour does show a degree of 
predictability within mainstream theoretical constraints, although reference to China’s 
particular strategic and social circumstances also is important.150 Some theorists have 
found merit in describing China’s foreign affairs behaviour in a realist frame; generally 
self-serving at the expense of others. 151 However liberal values that emphasise 
cooperation, interdependence and a recognition of less tangible forms of power are 
increasingly being recognised in China’s foreign policy. This thesis discusses the CIs in 
relation to the theories of soft power and public diplomacy. In addition, traditional 
Chinese values such as; Sinocentrism (China at the centre of the world), the mandate of 
heaven (which legitimises leadership), and rule by virtue and morality (rather than by 
citizen choice), can also be a guide to China’s international behaviour. 
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The (in)tangibility of power resources in the contemporary era
The evolving international environment is giving rise to new understandings of power -
a concept central to the study of politics. Classical realist theory tells us that a state’s 
interests are primarily shaped by its power, which is usually measured in terms of 
material resources and political influence. 152 Realist scholars such as Hans J. 
Morgenthau regard tangible factors such as raw materials, population, geography and 
military capabilities as important in accessing a nation’s power. 153 However, 
Morgenthau also mentioned national character, quality of diplomacy and quality of 
government as important considerations. Liberal scholars build on this to take a broader 
view of power that includes less tangible factors such as industrial development, 
national image, leadership and public support. 
In the contemporary era of globalisation, power has become less coercive and less 
tangible, especially among the developed democracies.154 Winning hearts and minds 
has always been strategic, and it is harder in the global information age, where the 
access to information is greater than before. Information is power and how the 
information is presented can have an influence on how it is perceived. Education, skills 
and technology have also become indications of a nation’s power, as these factors have 
been able to overcome disadvantages in location and natural resources. 
The “complex interdependence” of the world has made the pure exercise of military 
force problematic in the age of nuclear weapons and asymmetrical warfare. As former 
US House Speaker Newt Gingrich said of the US’s policies in Iraq, “The real test is not 
how many enemies I kill, but how many friends and allies I grow.”155 China has 
realised that military solutions practised alone, such as towards Taiwan, can have a 
negative impact on public opinion in neighbouring nations where a positive image is 
important for investment. 
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To counter claims that the US was declining as a world power, Joseph Nye argued that 
it was still strong in the power to influence foreign audiences because of the appeal of 
its culture and attraction to its values. 156 Later the theory of soft power will be 
discussed, which describes the power to get people to do what you want through 
influence rather than coercion, which can be achieved by strategies known as public 
diplomacy. While tangible factors such as military capability and commerce remain 
important and continue to take up most of the attention, other sources of power (such as 
institutions designed to influence international public opinion) are less obvious, and 
may not be receiving sufficient attention. Governments can use their military 
capabilities to threaten or if necessary, impose their will on another political opponent. 
Similarly they can use economic power to achieve desired outcomes by freezing assets, 
distribute aid or apply economic sanctions. But the contemporary era, Joseph Nye 
argues that to be effective, nations must combine their military and economic tools with 
programmes to influence foreign public opinion.157
Language and power
Language and power have always had a close relationship.158 Language is also one of 
the most effective tools for spreading culture and a central element in cultural 
globalisation. The language one speaks is important towards shaping how one views the 
world around them. According to structural linguists like Ferdinand de Saussure, 
The language one speaks actually determines the way an individual 
perceives the world around them, thus Farsi-, English-, and Thai-speakers, 
because of their linguistic differences, all possess different mental 
structures for organising the things they see around them.159
Considering this deep and close relationship between language and perception, it is 
strategic for a nation that aspires to great power status, to promote its language. 
Although the English language remains the most global of languages, Mandarin 
Chinese has the largest number of native speakers, and is growing in popularity as 
China has grown in economic influence.  
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In every period of globalisation, hegemonic powers have sought to promote unity by 
promoting their language.160 Examples of this are Greek, Latin, classical Chinese, 
Arabic, Russian, Portuguese, Spanish, French, and English. In nearly every case, 
economic, social, and/or political power has tended to be related to the reasons for the 
wide-spread adoption of the new form of communication. 161 As China grows in 
comprehensive national power, there is increased interest in how China may use 
cultural power to influence polities outside its borders. Several studies point to the 
increase in interest in learning the Chinese language related to China’s economic re-
emergence. According to Ding, in the second decade of the 21st century, the most 
important language to learn for job opportunities is likely to be Mandarin Chinese, 
given the large number of native speakers, and the rising status of China in the world
economy and international politics.162
Culture, globalisation and power
With the end of the Cold War, cultural factors, rather than ideologies have emerged as 
important influences in international relations. According to Ding and Saunders, culture
often supersedes rational choice and diplomacy as the major force in international 
relations.163 This relates to the way domestic culture influences national leaders, and the 
way international culture increasingly influences domestic politics. Culture is 
increasingly recognised as having an influence on decision-making at national and 
international levels. Culture can be viewed as a “filter of knowledge” through which 
publics and decision makers make decisions. 164 Cultural resources also influence 
national decision making, economic development, and social structure; as well as 
influencing global and local conflicts.165
Culture is another less tangible factor that can influence how power is distributed. 
Culture is commonly defined as “a set of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual, and 
emotional features of a society [that includes] ways of living together, values systems, 
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traditions and beliefs.” 166 The Marxist theory of “cultural hegemony” has been 
expressed by Antonio Gramsci who argued that by having a culture that all classes look
up to, is a means the bourgeoisie use to control other classes.167
In a globalised world where cultures constantly intersect, cultural identity and 
competition are becoming more important. The fluid nature of culture is one of the most 
obvious manifestations of globalisation. Examples of this fluidity include the 
worldwide popularity of Hong Kong martial arts films, or the homogenisation of 
cultures shown by the 1000 Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets serving Chinese versions 
of American fast food throughout China.168 Improved communications such as the 
internet and satellite broadcasting have enabled cultural products to be rapidly 
disseminated, assisting cultural fluidity. 
As improved communications have broken down the boundaries of the nation-state, 
new forms of cultural identification have become more important for an individual’s 
identity. As Ding and Saunders observe, few manifestations of globalisation are as 
visible, persuasive and resonant than global cultural exchange.169 National cultural 
autonomy has diminished as new transnational networks have formed around alliances, 
epistemic communities, and diasporic cultures, all of which have transformed the way 
international politics is conducted.170  The breaking down of national boundaries has led 
to people seeking a culture to identify with, and international actors seeking new ways 
to influence them. 
Diaspora groups based on a shared ethnicity and transnational communities have 
become more significant in world politics, and the 32 million overseas Chinese are also 
important to the Chinese Government. Overseas Chinese are an important link between 
China and the rest of the world, as investors and as a link to the public opinion in 
foreign countries. 171 Given the importance of culture to international relations, it is 
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logical that nations such as China are developing programmes like the CIs to promote 
their own culture to extend their influence abroad.
Soft Power
The attraction of a nation’s culture, institutions and policies in foreign public opinion,
can make it easier for the country being represented to meet its foreign policy goals. 
The ability to get people to do what you want without resorting to coercive tactics but 
rather getting them to want what you want, is the basis of a broader understanding of 
power. Soft Power has been defined by Joseph Nye as “Getting what you want with 
attraction rather than coercion or payments”.172 It rests on the ability to shape the 
preferences of others, and may be a more effective technique to obtain the outcomes 
one wants than coercion. A large organisation may be difficult to run on commands 
alone because, “you need people to buy into your values”.173 Nye describes the three 
types of power that nations must use to be effective in the contemporary international 
system in the following table.174
Table 1 Three types of power
Behaviours Primary 
Currencies
Government Policies
Military Power coercion
deterrence
protection
threats
force
coercive diplomacy
war
alliances
Economic 
Power
inducement
coercion
payments
sanctions
Aid
bribes
sanctions
Soft Power attraction values
culture
institutions
public diplomacy
bilateral and multilateral diplomacy
Nye also argues that soft power will become more important and contested in the 
“information age.”175 The resources that produce soft power derive often from the 
culture of the country it originates from, the values a country champions in its 
behaviour at home and abroad, and in its domestic and foreign policies, all of which 
strongly influence the preferences of others. Nye argues that countries that are likely to 
be more attractive and gain soft power are those with multiple channels of 
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communication that help frame issues, whose dominant culture is closer to international 
norms, and whose credibility is enhanced by their domestic and international 
policies.176
There are many early examples of the use of soft power. Nye mentions attempts by
French revolutionaries in the 18th century who sought to go over the heads of foreign 
governments to appeal directly to the populations of other countries with their
revolutionary ideology.177 He describes the formation of the Alliance Française in 1883 
as an attempt by the French Government to overcome its defeat in the Franco-Prussian 
war, by repairing the nation’s shattered prestige by promoting its language and 
culture.178 Britain and Germany followed by founding cultural institutes in the 1930s. 
Noticing the negative results of German mass propaganda, Britain was more successful 
at using a soft sell and influencing US public opinion by emphasising the dignity and 
elegance of British culture.179  
In China there has been an upsurge in interest in soft power since 1993 and leaders have
adopted it as the theoretical justification for the CIs. Chinese scholars realise that soft
power is an element of becoming a global power and the CIs are evidence of Beijing’s 
determination to develop the country’s soft power.180 President Hu stated at the 2007 
Party Congress that China would continue to expand efforts to showcase its culture and
language to the world.181 Chinese scholars also recognise that while the China model of 
development may create some admiration among foreign audiences, the country has a 
long way to go before it will have the international influence of great powers such as 
the US.182 Many liberal-minded intellectuals in China argue that the country will need 
more progress towards institution building in various fields – economic, social, cultural 
and political – to ensure the transition from the rule of men to the rule of law which 
would be appealing to developing states.183
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The power of an attractive culture
When a country’s culture is seen as attractive, vibrant and futuristic, it leads people to 
be more open to the policies of the government of that country. Narrow values and a 
culture limited in outlook are less likely to produce soft power. The flexibility and 
attraction of  US popular culture outpaced the state-run Soviet cultural programmes and 
helped US foreign policy goals, such as victory in the Cold War.184 Japanese leaders 
have noted that the popularity of Japanese cultural products such as manga comics 
represents a way to “grasp the hearts” of young people in many countries.185 Liking the 
food or clothing of the US however, does not necessarily translate into political 
allegiance, and culture appreciated in Australia may have the opposite reaction in Saudi 
Arabia.  However, polls show that popular culture has made the US seem exciting, rich, 
exotic, powerful, trend-setting, at the cutting edge of modernity and innovation.186 Such 
images have the affect of attracting people to the American lifestyle.
There are many examples of Chinese cultural soft power. For much of its history, China 
was the strongest nation in the world – not just in military and economic terms, but in 
the cultural sphere as well.187 In the fifth century, Admiral Zheng He’s exploratory 
voyages demonstrated the power of Chinese civilisation and established important links 
between China and other nations.188 Chinese cultural influence extended to tributary 
countries such as Japan, Korea and Vietnam, all of which took on aspects of Chinese 
language and culture. However, China’s role as a cultural source suffered a downturn in 
the mid 19th century, and this continued into the late 20th century. However, since Deng 
Xiaoping’s “open door” policy, Chinese culture has become again en vogue with 
traditional cultural products such as acupuncture, feng shui, and local cuisines, as well 
as modern arts such as music and acrobatics, finding new popularity around the 
world.189
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In areas such as sports and entertainment, China is developing a popular following 
which translates into soft power. Chinese sports stars such as basketball player Yao 
Ming (who helped propel his team the Houston Rockets to the top of the US National 
Basketball League), have been positive ambassadors for their home country. Yao is 
China’s premier athlete-ambassador who is the personification of Chinese soft power;
strong, confident, and affable without being arrogant, just the image of the “new China” 
the government wants to project.190 In addition, the success of Chinese films such as 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon and Hero have contributed to an image of China that 
is successful and glamorous, and has nothing to do with the Cultural Revolution or 
Tiananmen massacres.191 There has also been an expansion of tourism to China to 
cultural sites, and popular culture from mainland China is now consumed by many in 
South-East Asia. 
Foreign Policies as a source of attraction
Policies and actions towards others can also have an impact on the perceptions of a 
wider audience. Foreign policies may contribute to soft power when they are seen as 
legitimate or morally appealing and this gives them the opportunity to manipulate the 
agenda for public discussion.192 Many nations have gained soft power as a result of
their foreign policies which have gained international admiration. Norway is one 
country that has played a mediating role in trying to resolve conflicts such as the civil 
war in Sri Lanka. This role has led to respect for Norway in the international arena out 
of proportion to its size of five million people. According to one Norwegian politician 
his country’s policies gives his country “certain access”, and explained that its presence 
at so many negotiating tables elevates its usefulness to larger countries.193 The human 
rights policies of US President Jimmy Carter were rejected by military governments in 
Argentina in the 1970s, but led to considerable soft power for the US twenty years later 
when individuals who had been imprisoned there subsequently came to power.194
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At the beginning of the 21st century, China’s “new diplomacy,” which adopts a less 
confrontational, more sophisticated, and at times more constructive approach to 
international affairs,195 is a more effective means of winning international influence 
than previous Chinese foreign policy. An example of this is China’s efforts to settle or 
alleviate long-standing territorial disputes with nearly all its neighbours, and its 
participation in regional organisations such as the Association of South East Asian 
Nations (ASEAN). According to official Chinese spokespeople, this new approach 
seeks to support widely recognised norms governing international relations, peaceful 
settlement of international disputes, mutually beneficial ties, combating non-traditional 
security threats such as terrorism and transnational crime, and effective disarmament 
and arms control.196 This is a complete change from Maoist foreign policy which was 
often framed in unappealing and controversial terms in an attempt to “export 
revolution” to the Third World.197 China’s diplomacy since 2003 has included hosting 
the Six Party Talks aimed at reducing tension over North Korea’s nuclear programme, 
which has been seen as constructive by many Western nations especially the US.
The power of domestic values
The domestic values a nation champions and is identified with can influence foreign 
public opinion and affect the achievement of its international goals. Swiss efforts in 
promoting citizen political participation, and Japan’s domestic efforts to promote peace 
and human rights, have affected the image of these countries to foreign audiences. A 
nation’s values can also work at cross-purposes to official government policy, as shown 
by Hollywood movies that present libertine values towards sexuality but are outside the 
control of the US government, and undercut attempts to improve relations with 
conservative Islamic nations.198 South Africa’s racially discriminatory domestic policies 
became increasingly at odds with international values, and the country was subject to 
increasing international isolation eventually forcing the redistribution of power within 
the country.
China became acutely aware of the affect domestic policies can have on international 
public opinion. When its image went into freefall following the violent suppression of 
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the pro-democracy movement in 1989, international goodwill was harmed and 
economic development slowed as a result. The transformation of the Chinese economy 
is generating improved living standards for its population, and is a conspicuous 
example of success for many. Ramo has argued that China’s economic miracle presents 
the developing world a recipe for success which he calls the “Beijing Consensus,”199
which emphasises development according to a country’s characteristics and willingness 
to experiment. It can be seen as an alternative to the “Washington Consensus” of 
International Monetary Fund Loans, liberal democracy, and market economics. 
Although Beijing does not officially use the term Beijing Consensus, it is clear that it 
does promote China’s model of development to other countries, and this has generated 
interest in countries such as Iran and in the former Soviet republics.
Soft power: part of the assessment of a nation’s power
As has been demonstrated, intangible sources of power are being recognised as 
important in the contemporary globalised era, although coercive and economic power 
still remain important in any assessment of a nation’s power. All three sources of power 
are interrelated; China has been growing economically and this has allowed it to 
develop its military capabilities, but it recognises that it needs to develop a positive 
international image if it is to truly protect its national security. In the wake of the 
suppression of the 1989 democracy movement, foreign criticism and sanctions 
threatened to derail China’s modernisation efforts, and senior Chinese propaganda 
officials stressed that Western powers were attempting to undermine and divide China 
“using their powerful tools of propaganda and public opinion”.200 To fight this foreign 
hostility, China had to try to create a more positive image that reflected changes in 
Chinese society, they argued.201
Chinese scholars and policy makers have become more conscious of China’s soft power 
since Nye proposed it, but a soft power approach has been evident to Chinese foreign 
policy for centuries. In his address to the 17th Party Conference in October 2007, 
President Hu Jintao emphasised the need to build cultural soft power, as a means of 
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promoting domestic harmony and increasing international competition.202 It has been 
suggested that the concept (and the CIs themselves) has become popular in China 
because it corresponds principles of foreign relations of “non-interference” in internal 
affairs adopted in the 1950s, and China’s practise of working quietly behind the scenes 
to resolve international problems.203 While there has been a high level of interest in the 
concept of soft power, Sheng Ding argues that the concept has been embedded in 
Chinese foreign policy for centuries, as China’s cultural power frequently “conquered” 
neighbouring regions through assimilation rather than military victory.204
Many Chinese foreign policy scholars are conscious of soft power, and while it is 
apparent the country has made great headway, many feel that China has a long way to 
go to match the soft power of the West.205 Chinese intellectuals regard building both 
hard and soft power as an important task that the country faces if it is to reclaim its 
status as a global power. Since 2001 Chinese strategists have been abandoning a victim 
mentality focusing on China’s ill-treatment by Western imperialists, and emphasising 
acquiring great power status as a top foreign policy priority.206 Zhao Qizheng, the 
former director of the State Council Information Office stated that China should regard 
reviving its culture and strengthening cultural communication with the rest of the world
as an important task for the nation’s future.207 The fact China is developing the CIs is 
evidence of its intention to develop its soft power.
China is becoming more adept at using both hard and soft power instruments in unison 
to achieve strategic objectives. In 2005 China launched a successful “charm offensive” 
aimed at the people of Taiwan to dissuade moves toward independence from the 
mainland. China assisted visits of officials from the Kuomintang opposition party which 
was less supportive of independence, as well as extending tuition benefits to Taiwanese 
students and offering export incentives to farmers in the south of the island 
(traditionally a pro-Taiwan independence stronghold). The strategy was combined with 
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a military build-up along the Taiwan Straight, the combined effect being a curbing of 
the political fortunes of the pro-Taiwan independence movement for the time being.208  
Public Diplomacy
Attempts to influence foreign public opinion have existed in the West since the 19th
century, and early attempts have blurred the line between information and propaganda. 
The Committee on Public Information was established by President Wilson in 1917 and 
its Director George Creed established a government-run news service and ensured that 
motion picture producers portrayed America in a positive light. He insisted that his 
organisation did not constitute propaganda and was merely educational and 
informative.209 The office was disestablished soon after the peace of 1919, but in the 
lead-up to the Second World War foreign information services such as the State 
Department Division of Cultural Relations and the Office of Wartime Information were 
expanded.210 During the Cold War, radio played a significant role with both sides 
conducting major programmes through their stations Radio Moscow and the Voice of 
America. Some in the US favoured a “tough minded” approach which did not shy away 
from aggressive anti-Communism, while the “tender minded” argued that changing 
foreign attitudes was a gradual process and should be mentioned in years.211
Since the end of the Cold War, a new kind of diplomacy that seeks to influence public 
opinion through a wider range of channels than traditional diplomacy has become more 
recognised as a means to achieve influence. This new public diplomacy is described as 
“the process by which direct relations with people in a country are pursued to advance 
the interests and extend the values of those being represented.”212 Public diplomacy is 
growing in importance in international relations as nations seek to use persuasion as 
well as coercion, to achieve their foreign policy goals. The term “public diplomacy” 
came into prominence in the 1970s as the United States Information Agency (USIA) 
attempted to distinguish its work from the negative conations associated with the term 
propaganda. Public diplomacy represents an attempt to harness the influence of a 
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nation’s culture, values and policies in the pursuit of its foreign policy goals. 
Individually such policies have been in existence for some time (and have been 
recognised as having political implications), but their recent bringing together under 
one term recognises their collective strategic importance in contemporary international 
relations. Many nations, including China have revamped their diplomatic systems since 
the Cold War, to include public diplomacy departments. 
There has been renewed interest in public diplomacy, especially since the Islamic 
terrorist attacks on the US on September 11, 2001 as the competition for “hearts and 
minds” has entered a strategic dimension. Considerable developments are taking place 
around the world as nations seek to convert their soft power into tangible results. These 
include middle power nations such as the UK, Germany and Russia, as well minor 
states such as Venezuela or Norway and terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, but 
the major effort by China in recent years to improve its image by promoting its 
language and culture is perhaps the best example.213 In the view of Carnes Lord, victory 
over Islamic terrorism requires a comprehensive projection of American “strategic 
influence” the Middle East and beyond.214 Public diplomacy is increasingly recognised 
as a tool to achieve soft power that nations must deploy to be successful in international 
relations. 
The growth in interest in public diplomacy could be seen as a recognition that 
traditional Track One diplomacy has not kept pace with changes in technology and 
circumstances. Track One diplomacy refers to the official work of diplomats in their 
embassies, while Track Two diplomacy describes “official policy dialogue focused on 
problem solving, in which participants have some access to official policymaking 
circles”.215 Track Two diplomacy describes the often semi-formal efforts of academics, 
retired politicians, and officials who engage in dialogue that can bridge a gap that has 
grown insurmountable for official channels.216 In contrast to the one-to-one level of 
traditional diplomacy, public diplomacy targets the totality of the a political body.
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Some authors such as Harold Lasswell have argued that in modern industrialised 
societies, propaganda is more, not less relevant as an effective means of social 
control.217 However the public has become more sensitised to disinformation, and 
credibility is an important factor in effective public diplomacy. In China’s case, the 
CCP has adopted Western techniques of public relations and marketing to more 
effectively influence domestic and foreign publics.218
Categories of Public Diplomacy
Public diplomacy is a term that attempts to bring together the variety of programmes 
that are used not just to promote understanding, but shape public opinion. Cull has 
established a broad classification for public diplomacy that separates it into the 
following areas; listening, advocacy, cultural diplomacy and international 
broadcasting.219 The following figure describes public diplomacy and the subset of 
cultural diplomacy;
Figure 1 Aspects of public and cultural diplomacy
The CIs can be described by existing academic terminology: namely the language 
institutes of cultural diplomacy, which are part of public diplomacy. The strategic 
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policy level concerns public diplomacy, whereas cultural diplomacy describes a variety 
of sponsored cultural themed activities such as “country weeks”, choral tours, and the 
infrastructure to support them. The CIs are larger than just language institutes as they
cover business services, scholarships, cultural visits and language tuition. Their activity 
is similar to that of the British Council, Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute.
Listening is an aspect of public diplomacy described as an actor’s attempt to manage 
the international environment by collecting data about the opinions of their audience 
and using the data to redirect its policy.220 It can include government sponsored opinion 
polling and Switzerland has been a leader in this activity, although China certainly 
listens to international public opinion through its embassies.221 Advocacy refers an 
actors attempt to manage the international environment by communication activities 
such as news conferences, and is a dominant concept in American public diplomacy.222
China has strengthened this aspect after the External Propaganda Leading Group 
drafted a government spokesperson system in 1982.223 During the 1990s other Chinese 
government offices that were involved in foreign exchange activities, such as the 
Information Office of the State Council established new press briefing systems of their 
own, some of which were designed to boost the national government’s ability to 
establish a positive image of the state, and to internationally disseminate credible 
information about China.224
Exchange diplomacy is described as an international actor’s attempt to manage the 
international environment by sending its citizens abroad and accepting foreign citizens 
for a period of acculturation or study.225 This aspect of public diplomacy envisions that 
both parties will be transformed by the experience. China also participates in such 
activity which was focused on the communist bloc and third world during Mao’s reign. 
Exchanges increased during sensitive negotiations with nations such as Indonesia and 
Burma, and around national ceremonies such as May Day. They were mainly political 
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rather than educational in nature, and designed to create an impression of unity and 
national pride, and enabled the regime to claim it was internationally respected and 
accepted.226
Exchange diplomacy (and other forms of public diplomacy) are less under state control 
and can have negative as well as positive implications for a country’s interests. The 
chance that exchange participants can draw the “wrong conclusions” from a public 
diplomacy point of view, is demonstrated by the Egyptian exchange students living in 
Germany who formed the “Hamburg Cell” and were instrumental in the 9/11 plot. 227
International Broadcasting is an actor’s attempt to manage the international 
environment by using communication technologies to engage with foreign publics and 
includes contemporary web-based technologies. Earlier strategies utilised radio 
broadcasting of news which introduced subsequent cultural programmes, and thanks to 
the BBC World Service, international broadcasting has been the most widely known 
element in British public diplomacy.228 In some cases international broadcasting can be 
a tool to promote cultural and language diplomacy. China has invested in expansion of 
its international broadcasting through China Central Television (CCTV) 4 and 9, and 
China Radio International, and in 2004 made it a high priority to carry out international 
publicity in a way more suited to the needs of foreign audiences.229
Cultural Diplomacy and the CIs
Cultural diplomacy is another aspect of public diplomacy describing an actor’s attempt 
to manage the international environment by spreading its cultural resources and 
facilitating cultural transmission abroad.230 As nations seek to project their image, they 
presume that cultural resources can be used to generate social resources and foster trust, 
cooperation and collaboration. Discomfort with overt diplomatic goals have led some 
cultural diplomacy organisations such as The British Council to describe their work as 
“cultural relations,” however their core tools of exchanges and teaching fall within the 
definition of cultural diplomacy.231 The great spenders in cultural diplomacy have been 
  
226 Herbert Passin, China's Cultural Diplomacy (London  China Quarterly, 1962).
227 Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," p. 40.
228 Ibid.  p.34.
229 Aoyama China’s Public Diplomacy. p. 10.
230 Cull, "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories." p. 33.
231 Ibid.
61
the French, who have invested heavily in an international network of schools to sustain 
the French language, underscoring that French influence is largely tied to the survival of 
French speaking societies.232
State-sponsored academic country programmes such as American, South Asian or 
European studies, government sponsored sports events (such as the Beijing 2008 
Olympics), artistic tours, international cooperation, and infrastructure support though 
embassies for cultural exchange and language institutes, are examples of cultural 
diplomacy. Financial support for academic country study programmes include the EU’s 
support for research at the National Centre for Research at Canterbury University, for 
example. Cultural diplomacy can also include tours of artefacts, and a successful 
example would be the exhibition of the Terracotta Warriors of Xi’an (an archaeological 
discovery dating back centuries in China’s history) which first toured the world in the 
1980s. It drew large crowds and raised awareness of China’s pre-communist history.
Language studies and the provision of language learning materials are a large part of 
many cultural diplomatic programmes and are often operated by a global network of 
semi-independent organisations. These organisations often generate substantial income 
in the form of student fees that add to funds provided by the foreign ministry and other 
government departments.233 Japan supports the Japan Exchange and Teaching scheme 
(JET) that serves to brings 6000 individuals to Japan to teach in Japanese schools, and 
promote international understanding. 234 The United Kingdom, through the British 
Council employs 1,800 language teachers who conduct 1.1 million hours of language 
training abroad.235 France, through Alliance Française and the French Cultural Centres 
supports language and publishing programmes. Alliance Française was founded in 1893 
as a non-political organisation dedicated to promotion of the literature, art, history and 
language of France.236
Not all cultural diplomacy organisations promote a language – Australia and the United 
States for example do not have a unique language to promote, but prefer to promote 
unique aspects of their identity with the aim of influencing foreign perceptions. While 
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China has been involved in cultural diplomacy such as sponsored artistic tours and 
exchanges in the past they lacked the central coordination of the CIs. 
Cultural diplomacy can fail however, and an example is the efforts of the former Soviet 
Union to promote itself as it wanted to be seen, rather than it actually was during the 
Cold War.237 Soviet minorities were presented in external publishing as flourishing in 
their diversity when actually, the opposite was the case. Sports diplomacy, radio 
broadcasts and international publishing were used to build a picture of a Communist 
state that cultivated diversity, expression and excellence when actually this was not a 
true picture. The investment won friends in the short term, but could not counter the 
reality of political oppression and economic decline revealed in the 1980s,238 and the 
eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union.
Cultural diplomacy has been used in to achieve foreign policy goals before by China. 
Performing arts troupes, scholarly visits, and other cultural exchanges were hallmarks 
of Chinese attempts to break out of Cold War isolation. The objectives of such activities 
were recognised as “the promotion of China’s policies and position in the world.”239
The expansion of post Cold-War activities is aimed at influencing foreign public 
opinion, that a rising China will not be threatening, and to allow for further 
development as a global power. Although language institutes differ from country to
country in areas such as funding and relationship to their government, the CIs have 
much more in common with the other language institutes than previous Chinese 
propaganda techniques which deployed friendship organisations, Peking Opera tours,
and foreign friends, for example. 
China has become increasingly conscious of the theories of public diplomacy and soft 
power. Unlike its English translation, in Chinese xuanchuan (propaganda) does not 
have a negative connotation, and is associated with benign activities such as the release 
of news, general shaping ideology and even advertising.240 The increasing use of the 
terms public diplomacy (and soft power) in official speeches has led to greater 
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professionalism in China’s public diplomacy activities.241 A new division of China’s 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs focusing on public diplomacy was set up in 2004, and 
officials stated its aim was to “win understanding and support for foreign policies”.242
Theory of Chinese foreign policy
While the concepts of soft power and public diplomacy have been useful for 
international scholars to understand the CIs, the use of these terms by Chinese scholars
reflect a broadening of the conceptual sources of China’s foreign policy. For some time 
international relations theory was not taught in China, instead interpretations of the 
viewpoints of Marx, Lenin and Mao were the only theories of international politics.243
For Marxist scholars, class analysis is the basic method for understanding international 
relations; the bourgeoisie and the proletariat are the main actors, and the substance of 
international relations is nothing but class struggle.244 Chinese international relations 
scholars were constrained by ideological shackles which required them to quote 
Chinese leaders, promote socialism and justify government decisions.245
The study of international relations theory is becoming recognised by Chinese leaders 
as a vital aspect of social science research which could contribute to the development of 
effective foreign policies in serving China’s interests. Chinese scholars began to adopt 
some contemporary liberal values of international relations that gave more emphasis to 
regional integration, multilateralism, human rights, and international legal order after 
1978.  However Chinese foreign policy remained strongly influenced by long-held CCP 
values that emphasise national sovereignty and territorial integrity. The Chinese 
government (as with other governments) remains inclined to accept the values it likes 
and reject those it doesn’t, but shifts in values continues to lead shifts in behaviour. 
Changes brought on by globalisation such as cultural fluidity and interdependency have
been recognised in China, which has established new tactics to achieve foreign policy 
goals.
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At the turn of the 21st century, more and more Chinese scholars are turning to 
traditional Chinese thinking and trying to find similarities and differences between 
Chinese and Western philosophical traditions to explain Chinese behaviour in 
international relations.246 There is increased interest in the role that domestic culture 
plays in the foreign policy decision making of other countries as well as China. 
Tradition Chinese values such as meritocracy in which leaders are selected by scholars 
(rather than by all citizens) on the basis of their virtue, and Sinocentrism which regards
China as the political, economic and cultural centre of the world, can also been seen 
playing a part in the conceptual sources of Chinese foreign policy. Nationalism and 
Confucian concepts such as harmony, are increasingly being used to underpin the 
current generation of communist leaders’ policy innovation, and promote domestic and 
global stability. 
Conclusion
A broader conception of power is emerging in the post-Cold War era of globalisation 
that recognises traditional factors such as military and economic power, and adds 
education, technology, leadership, institutions and the ability to influence public 
opinion. Soft power represents the ability to influence an audience without resort to 
coercive tools and is becoming increasingly important and contested in the globalised 
era. The concept has been present in Chinese foreign policy for centuries and current  
government policies aim to improve this aspect of becoming a global power. Trade and 
investment in foreign countries, as well as strategies to improve international influence 
and image known as public diplomacy, can grow soft power.
The CIs represent a package of programmes designed to improve China’s soft power, 
and are an example of the language institutes aspect of cultural diplomacy that is part of 
the public diplomacy that many nations practice. They are part of renewed interest in 
China and other nations in soft power and public diplomacy in the era of globalisation. 
Although public diplomacy attempts to distinguish itself from propaganda, the aim is 
the same: to influence foreign publics. China’s public diplomacy is increasing the 
resonance of Chinese culture throughout the world, however, its focus on the cultural 
aspect of public diplomacy may limit the effectiveness of its public diplomacy while its 
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political values (also important to international perceptions) remain far from 
international norms. 
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Chapter Four 
POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND THE CONFUCIUS 
INSTITUTES
Introduction
The relationship between culture and politics is always a complex one, and it is an 
important issue for state-sponsored cultural diplomacy. Many governments afford some 
political independence to their language institutes involved in cultural diplomacy such 
as Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute which have been perceived as politically 
independent,247 but as this chapter will show, there is rarely a complete separation. As 
chapter three discussed, language and cultural institutes are one aspect of cultural 
diplomacy, and cultural diplomacy is part of public diplomacy. Such activities are 
designed to achieve soft power. This chapter will compare China’s cultural diplomacy 
with that of other countries, and discuss the relationship between the Chinese political 
system and the CIs. As will be described, the issue is not whether there is political 
influence on cultural diplomacy, but how transparent that influence is. Political decision 
making in China is largely controlled by the CCP, which has a complex relationship 
with the CIs.
Since it came to power, the CCP has deeply penetrated Chinese culture as a means of 
achieving its political goals. The Party also had a dominating, but outwardly hidden 
influence on the state bureaucracy. In foreign affairs, the Party has become more 
flexible in allowing organisations such as the CIs to represent China, but ultimately, it 
sets policy direction. Kenneth Lieberthal in his book on governance in China, describes 
that in China as with all other major political systems, the real layout of power and 
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governance is different from the picture presented by formal descriptions and published 
rules of procedure.248
The Chinese political system is set up so that the Party can dominate the state 
bureaucracy, in a way that is entirely different from the way political parties operate in 
developed democracies. The system that developed after 1949 was influenced by 
imperial Chinese as well as Soviet systems, both of which stressed centralised control 
and bureaucratic administration, buttressed by ideology and leaving little room for 
private interests and organised opposition to the state.249 China’s entire political system, 
including policy decision making, legislative power and policy implementation, is led 
by the CCP which has an interlocked relationship with the state bureaucratic sector. All 
key policy decisions are made outside the government and within the Party, and the 
term “Party-State” describes this relationship.250 The military functions separately to 
the state bureaucracy, but is also directly supervised by the Party. The Chinese political 
system has a certain amount of hidden operating procedures and is a highly 
personalised rather than institutionalised system.251 The dominant position of the Party 
derived its role from in part, leading the successful communist revolution in 1949,252
however in the contemporary era, it is finding new means to justify its continued rule.
Descriptions of the governing structure on the CI website253 present them as governed 
by a leadership council composed of Chinese state bureaucratic organisations and 
foreign representatives, but do not mention the CCP. A distinctive feature of the 
organisation of the CIs that are located in foreign countries is that they are not directly 
controlled from Beijing, but also have substantial local input. Being joint ventures 
between a foreign educational organisation, the CI Leadership Council and a Chinese 
university, the CIs are subject to several sources of influence. Many nations have 
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cultural diplomacy programmes that maintain some political independence, (such as the 
Goethe Institute) which also carry out activities on behalf of their nation’s government. 
However, the interlocked relationship between the Party and the state bureaucracy in 
China, adds a new dynamic to this situation.
International comparisons of cultural diplomacy
As the importance of culture in foreign policy has become more appreciated, a wide 
range of cultural diplomacy activities have developed throughout the world. Margret 
Wyszomirski compared the cultural diplomacy of several nations against the following 
dimensions; goals and priorities, structure, programme tools, and funding,254 and her 
study forms the basis of my comparison with China’s activity in this field. Language 
institutes are one aspect of cultural diplomacy and are compared in the following table 
taken from a presentation by Don Starr.255
Table 2 Leading language institutes
Name Foundation
date
Annual 
budget
(Millions 
USD)
Status Branches 
worldwide
Language/
culture
Aims
Alliance 
Franciase
1883 16.4 Independent 
branches
1081 in 
35 
countries
French To widen access 
to French 
language and 
culture
Società 
Dante
Alighieri
1889 Funded 
by 
members
Independent
NGO
450 Italian Promote the study 
of Italian language 
and culture 
throughout the 
world
Goethe 
Institute
1925 269 Government 
funded + 
sponsorship
125 in 76 
countries
German Promote the study 
of German and 
international 
cultural exchange
British 
Council
1934 736
269 from 
UK govt.
Government/
partnership
150 + 200
proposals
English Build mutually 
beneficial 
relationships 
between people of 
the UK and other 
countries
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Japan 
Foundation
1972 140 Government
funded
19 in 18 
countries
Japanese Promotion of arts 
and cultural 
exchange
Instituto 
Cervantes
1991 109 Government 
funded
60 in 30 
counties
Spanish To promote the 
education, the 
study and the use 
of Spanish 
universally 
Instituto
Camões
1992 Government
funded
Culture 60
Language 
40
Portuguese To promote the 
Portuguese 
language and 
culture worldwide 
Confucius 
Institute
2004 12 Government/ 
partnership
300+ Mandarin 
Chinese
Aimed at 
promoting 
friendly relations 
with other 
countries and 
enhancing the 
understanding of 
Chinese language 
and culture
Other similar organisations include the “Association Polish Community”, The Czech 
Centres, Danish Cultural Institute, Estonian Institutes, Finnish Cultural and Academic 
Institutes, Hellenic Foundation for Culture (Greece), the Hungarian Centres, The Korea 
Foundation, the Pushkin Institute (Russia), and the Swedish Institute.
As well as language institutes in foreign countries, nations also use a variety of other 
cultural diplomacy tools. The following programme tools can be part of the repertoire 
of cultural diplomacy: the exchange of individuals for education and cultural purposes, 
sending exhibitions and performances abroad, sponsoring seminars and conferences, 
support for cultural centres abroad, country studies programmes, international 
cooperation on cultural projects and activities that are related to the trade in cultural 
products and services. 256 Staff working in embassies and consulates also provide 
support for cultural diplomacy. Some countries such as Austria provide infrastructure in 
the form of Foreign Ministry personnel dedicated to managing cultural diplomacy,
where it is estimated that approximately 25% of Austrian foreign ministerial staff are 
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engaged in cultural diplomacy activities.257 Many governments support the work of 
organisations engaged in cultural activities who may use seconded foreign service staff, 
private employees and foreign nationals. The United Kingdom employs the British 
Council in this regard, and France supports 151 French Cultural Centres and 219 
Alliance Française offices. Like other nations, China maintains large education and 
cultural sections in its embassies, but the CIs are its flagship cultural diplomacy 
organisation.
Goals and Priorities
Many countries engaged in cultural diplomacy share a desire to project their image and 
values abroad, however each does this in a different way. Japan’s cultural diplomacy 
aims to “introduce Japanese culture to people throughout the world.”258 In contrast, the 
British Council aims to focus its activity on three areas of central importance to the 
international interests of the UK; intercultural dialogue - “especially with countries and 
communities where the UK is less trusted,” supporting UK’s creative and knowledge 
economy, and highlighting the case for tackling climate change.259 Canada’s goals 
include fostering better understanding of Canada, and given its dual linguistic identity, 
it has a particular interest in other French speaking countries. Some nations have 
specific goals such as Australia, which seeks to project a positive image and “dispel the 
image of itself as an European-derivative culture” and replace it with an emphasis on its 
unique history and geography.260 French cultural diplomacy seeks to promote French 
culture with an emphasis on cultural diversity and cultural cooperation,261 thereby 
supporting French influence in the Francophone world. 
The central aim of China’s contemporary public diplomacy (which includes cultural 
diplomacy) is to project the image that China’s culture is admirable and that China’s 
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intentions are benign.262 Cultural diplomacy has been a part of China's diplomacy for 
some time, but in the 21st century it has become wider in scope and more professional. 
On coming to power in 1949 China began a large programme of cultural diplomacy, the 
purpose being the promotion of China’s policies and position in the world.263 Broadly, 
China’s contemporary public diplomacy aims to seek understanding of its political 
system and policies, convince the world that it does not have to be feared, show that is a 
good international citizen, and be acknowledged as having a respectable culture.264 The 
CIs aim to satisfy the demands of people wanting to learn the Chinese language and 
promoting understanding of Chinese culture.265
Funding
China spends substantially less on the CIs than many Western European counterparts 
spend on similar language institutes. Xu Lin, Chief Executive Officer of Hanban stated 
in 2006, “The British Council spends over 3 billion pounds [$US 5 billion] a year” and 
China is only spending about $US 12 million on the CIs.266 The Chinese Government 
actually spent a total of $US 25 million in 2006, promoting the Chinese language 
internationally according one study. 267 Xu Lin’s claim could not be verified, but 
according to the 2007-8 annual report of the British Council, it received total income of 
$US 838 million, $US 281 coming from the British Government’s Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office, the rest coming from income generating activities such as 
English language tuition.268
The CIs share costs because they are joint ventures but China is investing substantially 
in establishing a global network. Partnerships between Chinese universities and foreign 
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learning institutions rather than sole government sponsorship put the CIs on a different 
economic basis than fully funded programmes. Instead of building offices in cities in 
which they operate, the CIs team up with local partners and take space in their buildings 
or get foreign governments to pay for their housing. Instead of sending teachers who 
instruct foreigners directly, partner Chinese universities send teacher trainers who can 
help upgrade the skills of local Chinese teachers, and the CI receives income from those 
who take their courses, similar to the British Council.269
The French government is the world’s leading supporter of cultural diplomacy 
spending over a billion US dollars in the field in 2001,270 although most of this was on 
French Cultural Centres, not Alliance Française. The Alliance Française is a franchise 
operation generating most of its funding from course fees. The French Government 
subsidises Alliance Française headquarters, but has no financial input into local 
organisations which are entirely self-funding.271 However, France is a major supporter 
of other aspects of cultural diplomacy, spending in 2001, $US 667 million on 
exchanges, and $US 378 million on infrastructure such as cultural centres.272 France is 
also the highest spender on cultural diplomacy on a per capita basis, spending four 
times as much as its nearest rival Canada by this measure. The British Government was
second in total expenditure on cultural diplomacy in 2001, spending a total of $676 
million ($260 million on the British Council).273
Wyszomirski compared United States spending on cultural diplomacy and found that it 
had a minimal level of government expenditure in 2003. Activities identified were the 
Fulbright Program, the International Visitor Program and the Speakers Program, with
funding that equated to $184 million, well below France and $25 million less than 
Japan.274 It should be noted that this does not include other aspects of public diplomacy, 
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which includes media advocacy and international broadcasting which the US has 
traditionally been strong in. 
Structure
In most countries engaged in cultural diplomacy, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has 
primary responsibility for such activity. In France, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
exerts primary direction over Alliance Française, l’Association Française d’Action 
Artistique (for cultural exchanges) and the French Cultural Centres, and communication 
with other ministries is limited, and largely informal.275 The British Council receives 
government funding from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, (in addition to the majority 
income contribution from course fees) and has an independent governing board. In 
Japan cultural diplomacy falls under the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, 
Science and Technology, making it easier to integrate educational and cultural 
exchanges into existing similar administrative structures. 276 Other nations have a 
stronger trade focus to their cultural diplomacy. In Australia, the Department of Foreign 
Affairs and Trade works through a quasi-nongovernmental organisation, the Australian 
International Cultural Council.277 Cultural diplomacy is rarely if ever separate from 
government structures. As will be discussed, several Chinese state (and Party) 
organisations are connected to the CI leadership structure.
Cultural diplomacy and political independence
There is a relationship between a nation’s political system and its culture and this 
relationship affects the credibility of its cultural diplomacy. Diplomacy is a political
activity, working in the international interests of a government, and cultural diplomacy 
also, seeks the influence that derives from greater understanding. For example, the 
Swedish Institute is a government agency that develops mutual relationships through 
awareness and interest in Sweden abroad, and works in close cooperation with foreign 
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partners and Swedish Embassies and consulates. 278 In many cases of cultural 
diplomacy, staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs are involved. The Goethe Institute 
receives full funding from the German Federal Government, but according to its New 
Zealand Director Judith Geare; its political independence is important and guaranteed, 
“because of Germany’s history”, and the German government now cannot tell the 
institute how to define or promote Germany’s language or culture.279 Yet its activities 
are aimed at influencing world public opinion in Germany’s favour. 
Political independence in cultural diplomacy is important for both Germany and Italy, 
which have a history of manipulation of culture by fascist regimes. Their contemporary 
cultural diplomacy emphasises a separation between the government and the nation’s 
contemporary cultural diplomacy organisations. These nations’ cultural diplomacy was 
in existence prior to World War Two, but received a boost following their return to the 
pre-war international system as cultural, rather than military powers. A high degree of 
administrative independence from political structures is evident in Italy’s cultural 
diplomacy organisation the Dante Alighieri Society, where its branches are entirely 
independently financed. 
China too, has sought to distance the CIs from political influence – at least in the image 
presented to foreign audiences. For example, the constitution of the Confucius Institutes 
Headquarters describes itself as “non-profit and having the status of an independent 
corporate body.”280 Staff of the CIs emphasise that their work is primarily educational, 
and not related to any political or security goals – despite the concerns of some foreign 
critics. 
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China’s Party-State system
China’s political system has evolved considerably in the sixty years since 1949, but 
continues to preserve a central role for the CCP. The current Chinese system was 
influence by its early connections to the Soviet Union, where the Party and the state 
were closely intertwined, and for which the term “party-state” has been created.281 The 
CCP is the “state of the state,” and all important policy decisions in China are made 
outside the government, but are entirely monopolised by the Party.282 Moreover, the 
Party tends to conceal the extent of its influence.283 Although the current Chinese 
political system is in transition towards less hierarchy, greater regularity and a more 
meaningful division of responsibilities, it is far from shedding the features of its 
revolutionary origins, and Mao’s legacy where a few powerful individuals had great 
power over many people.
During Mao’s reign the political system did not tolerate any dissent and exercised 
totalitarian control over many aspects of life; Mao had earned such a position of fear 
and respect that his word had the effect of law.284 The state bureaucracy became a tool 
for carrying out Mao’s directions, and the Party was responsible for supervising it. 
However the under the current system, the Party has recently been described as 
“popular authoritarianism.”285 It this system, the Party maintains popular support by 
using a variety of methods of mass persuasion to mould public opinion into accepting 
the current system.
The system for governing the country established in 1949 is formally divided into three 
interlocked systems; the Party, the military and the state bureaucracy. As with many 
major political systems, the actual functioning of authority in China differs 
considerably from official organisational charts.286 The revolutionary origins of the 
People’s Republic is one of the factors that have created a highly personalised rather 
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than an institutionalised political system.287 The Party has a dual identity with some 
powerful individuals holding important positions in the Party as well as executive 
positions in the state bureaucracy.288 In the current system, at the top of the political 
hierarchy is the Politburo of the Party and the State Council, the latter supervising all 
the government ministries. All major policy decisions are made in the Politburo, and 
the State Council translates strategic decisions into concrete policies.289
The xitong
The CCP has mechanisms to ensure dominance over the state bureaucracy, but tends to 
conceal its influence to the outside. Chinese state officials themselves have to follow 
the authority derived from Party systems, as well as that of their supervisors within 
their state organisation.290 The system of formally separate but functionally related 
organisations  known as xitong, and is one way the leadership deals with broad tasks it 
wants achieved. Each xitong is led by a Small Leading Group headed by a member of 
the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the CCP.291 Although they may represent a 
diverse group of public and private organisations from the outside, they are part of an 
interconnected system that must follow directives from the top. This system results 
from the CCP’s origins as a revolutionary party when it was necessary to control many
organisations covertly. The main xitong include areas that are of the most importance to 
the Party such as economic affairs, Party development, security and propaganda. One 
key concept of the xitong system is that all organisations within it must follow centrally 
established policies.292 Chinese officials generally try to keep these key dimensions of 
the political system hidden from view.293
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Nomenklatura
In addition, the Party has developed other systems for ensuring its policies are carried 
out by the state bureaucratic system. Other mechanisms the Party uses to control the 
bureaucracies are the nomenklatura system, and front organisations. Nomenklatura is a 
Russian word describing the system in which the Party exercises the power of 
appointment and dismissal of not only all senior appointments in the Party and  
government, but also in those in the judicial system, universities, and enterprises (but 
not the private sector).294 Through this system the Party can determine who reaches, 
and who stays in elite levels of society295 and can appoint CCP members (usually with 
expertise in the field) to state bureaucratic positions. It was described during the Mao 
era as jianren or “double hatting”296 and in the contemporary era as yiba shou or “hold 
everything in one hand.”297
Also, in some cases, key Party officials themselves directly take charge of state bodies. 
The CCP Organisational Department is responsible for supervising the appointment and 
dismissal of a large number of positions with the state sector and the Party. This means 
that even some positions that are specified as “elected” in the State Constitution, are 
subject to the Party’s nomenklatura system. The 1989 protests generated such broad 
support across Party and state units, that the top leaders increased the number of 
appointments that were subject to appointment in this way.298 In this system the same 
individual could participate in policy formulation within the Party and supervise its 
implementation wearing their other “hat” in their state sector.
  
294 Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. p. 234.
295 Ibid.
296 Te-chi Yu, Mass Persuasion in Communist China, Cambridge, MT Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 
1964), p. 70. Cited in Brady, Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary China. 
p. 10.
297 Ibid. p. 10.
298 Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform. p. 297.
78
China’s Propaganda and Education xitong
The CCP attaches great importance to propaganda, referring to it as the sphere of 
“guiding minds”. 299 It is one of the two main means the Party uses to achieve 
legitimacy with the Chinese population in the contemporary era, alongside economic 
development. The Party’s response to the June 1989 disturbances was reinforce its hold 
on power through economic development in one hand, and propaganda and thought 
work in the other. 300 The term “propaganda” according to its Chinese translation 
xuanchuan, does not have the negative connotation of disinformation and distortion it 
does in the English language, referring instead to broadcasting, general shaping 
ideology and even public information. As a result of the negative perception in 
developed democracies, Chinese officials are increasingly using the term public 
diplomacy to describe foreign publicity activities.301
The CCP’s Propaganda and Education xitong (system) is an extremely large network 
for managing the fields of information and education in the domestic society and 
beyond. An extensive range of organisations come under China’s propaganda and 
education xitong including all forms of  broadcasting and publishing, the internet, 
education, and entertainment. 302 Some of the organisations in this system are led 
directly, others are less directly guided. The role of the propaganda system in China has 
been likened to the role of the Church in medieval Europe; having vast sway over 
society, but largely on moral grounds with little legal standing. 303 These days, 
instructions are often issued verbally or in special secret internal bulletins.304
At the top of China’s propaganda xitong is a senior leader supervising all foreign and 
domestic propaganda who is a member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo. 
The current holder of the position is Li Changchun, and the State President and CCP 
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General Secretary (currently Hu Jintao) may also take an interest in propaganda 
work.305 At the next level are two “leading groups” made up of senior figures in the 
Party-State system: the CCP Propaganda and Thought Work Leading Group (which 
controls domestic ideological/information activities), and the Foreign Propaganda 
Leading Group (which works in an international environment where it must balance its 
influence with foreign interests). 
External publicity/propaganda
As China has recognised the importance of international image and public opinion, 
“external propaganda work” has become more important to the leadership and as a tool 
of foreign policy.306 Foreign concepts such as public diplomacy have been adapted to 
this purpose. The CCP External Propaganda Leading Group (EPLG) supervises 
activities such as external broadcasting, foreign media liaison, public diplomacy, 
exchange organisations, and even international relations studies.307 China’s external 
propaganda has two separate foci: overseas Chinese whom Beijing regards as important 
as a source of political and economic support, and non-Chinese foreigners who 
represent a more diverse, but still important group.308
Chinese foreign publicity/propaganda aims to provide a Chinese perspective as much as 
manipulate foreign public opinion.309 The aims of China’s external propaganda are (1) 
to tell China’s story to the world and promote Chinese culture; (2) to counter hostile 
foreign propaganda (such as the “China threat” theory); (3) countering Taiwanese 
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independence; and (4) propagating Chinese foreign policy.310 The message it wishes to 
convey is associating China with modernisation, dynamism and global citizenship, 
while sensitivities include Tibet, human rights and Taiwan.311 Some of the results of
Chinese involvement in the field of international publicity/propaganda is greater 
professionalism amongst Chinese officials and journalists involved, and growing 
engagement with the rest of the world.312
Governance of the Confucius Institutes
Organisationally, the CI Leadership Council is a semi-independent decision-making 
body made up of Chinese state bureaucracy appointees with a minority of foreign 
representatives supervised by China’s State Council, but functionally, it is led by the 
CCP’s External Propaganda Leading Group. Between 2004 and 2007 the CIs in foreign 
countries were directed by Hanban and its own Leadership Council. The 33 member CI 
Leadership Council was introduced in December 2007 to “better manage” the CIs.313 It 
includes a chair, five vice-chairs, 12 executive council members from related state 
departments, and 15 non-executive members (10 foreign representatives and 5 from 
partner Chinese universities). This is significant because it includes the presence of 
foreign individuals who head the boards of CIs in their countries, as well as 
representatives from Chinese universities and state departments. The links to several 
state departments, and the presence of a senior politician as the chair, reflect the 
importance given to “soft power” activities.314 A representation of the leadership of the 
CIs taken from the CI website315 follows;
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Figure 2 CIs and State administration
Actual functional system
External propaganda is an important area for the CCP, although the Party tends to 
conceal its influence on policy implementation. As with all major political systems, the 
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actual flow of authority is different from the image created by formal published charts 
and procedures.316 The CI programme is ostensibly a joint venture between the Chinese 
state sector and foreign representatives, and in formal official descriptions, the CIs are 
led by the CI Leadership Group, which is ultimately supervised by the State Council. 
However, the CCP exercises such broad management of China’s state sector and it has 
the ability to guide the CI Leadership Council in a variety of hidden mechanisms which 
include the xitong system, nomenklatura appointments, and front organisations. 
Through these mechanisms, the CCP can ensure that its priorities in the state system are 
implemented. 
The CIs are subject to the influence of several xitong, with the Propaganda and 
Education xitong having the largest influence. The foreign affairs and finance xitong
also have a presence on the CI Leadership Council in the form of departments that are 
subject to their ambit. The two highest authorities in this xitong are the two leading 
groups: Propaganda and Thought Work, and External Propaganda. The External 
Propaganda Leading Group (EPLG), is the leading authority in the Chinese system 
tasked with managing foreign public opinion. The State Council Information Office
(SCIO) is outwardly responsible for external government publicity such as stating 
government policy, but as will be discussed subsequently, it actually functions as the 
CCP’s Office of Foreign Propaganda (OFP). Many of the state organisations 
represented on the CI Leadership Council (such as the Ministries of Culture, and 
Publishing) are also subject to the authority of the domestically focused Propaganda 
and Thought Work Leading Group (and its administrative body the Central Propaganda 
Department). Actual political influence on the CIs is described by the following 
diagram;
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Figure 3 Functional political influence
The CI Leadership Council reflects the nomenklatura system where one person can 
wear a hat in both the Party and state bureaucracy. The Chair of the CI Leadership 
Council is Liu Yandong, who is also a member of the CCP’s Politburo as well as being 
a member of the State Council.317 She is a long-term member of the CCP with a 
background in youth ideological education. She took over the chair of the CI 
Leadership Council from Chen Zhili: a senior Chinese leader with links to a faction of 
the CCP associated with former President Jiang Zemin, and also who has been a State 
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Councillor and member of the Central Committee of the CCP.318 Liu was a Chinese 
counterpart to meetings with representatives of the Dali Lama, and restated the CCP’s 
policy that Tibet is an inseparable part of China in meetings with leaders of Indian 
subcontinent countries during a visit in 2007.319
The inclusion of foreign representatives on the CI Leadership Council in December 
2007, can be seen as an attempt to improve the performance and the public perception 
of the network. In response to concerns about lack of direction and vision from Hanban 
the CI system has become more formalised and systematic. Additionally, foreign 
concerns about the CIs being a tool of the CCP, could be one reason for greater 
structural and physical autonomy of the CI Leadership Council.320 It could also reflect 
the increased workload of administering the CIs, and a separation from Hanban’s other 
roles promoting the Chinese language to foreigners.
The cultural diplomacy of all nations are connected to the state sector of that country, 
often but not always the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Ministry of Culture, and this 
is the case in China. The CIs are administratively connected to the State Council 
through the various ministry representatives that sit on its Leadership Council. 
However, through less than obvious mechanisms the CCP maintains guidance over the 
CIs, something that may not be clear in partnerships with foreign learning institutions.
Other ministries represented on the CI leadership Council such as finance, 
broadcasting, and publishing may play a role in decision making relating to their area.
The State Council Information Office (SCIO) which is represented on the CI 
Leadership Council is a front organisation for the CCP’s OFP.321 This is one way the 
CCP can supervise the implementation of Party policy when it relates to sensitive areas 
relating to foreign publicity. The SCIO/OFP researches and develops China’s foreign 
publicity activities, as well as monitoring and censoring all activities within China that 
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fall within the foreign propaganda ambit such as foreign news briefing, social science 
research and controlling the internet.322 It also manages China’s public diplomacy 
which is directed at foreign audiences.323 The SCIO was set up in 1991 in order to 
improve the CCP government’s international image in the wake of the events of 1989. 
China’s external publicity/propaganda covers a wide and important sector 
encompassing external broadcasting, publishing and the CIs.324
The sources of funding for the CIs is officially from the Leadership Council and course 
fees, but there is indication of the “guiding hand” 325 of the CCP’s propaganda 
leadership operating as well. In an example of this process, David Shambaugh writing 
in The China Journal, stated that the CI establishment process typically involves 
foreign universities being approached by the Education Counsellor of the local Chinese 
Embassy offering “no strings attached” funds to establish a CI. The recipient is 
informed that the funding comes from China’s Ministry of Education, but in fact, “it is 
laundered through the MOE from the CCPPD’s External Propaganda Department. [the 
CCP’s OFP] ”.326
Senior Chinese leaders support the CIs in words and actions. Evidence of links between 
the Party and the CIs are the support in speeches of senior Chinese leaders such as 
President Hu Jintao, 327 who has presided at CI opening ceremonies, and Standing 
Politburo member and propaganda chief Li Changchun who stated that the CIs are an 
important means to promote China to the world.328 In addition, the CIs constitution uses 
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language which reflects official discourse, for example the goal to “construct a 
harmonious world”329 which mirrors the current Party line. 
According to the Constitution of the Headquarters, each CI must abide by Chinese 
policies as well as local laws.330 Several CI directors who replied to email questions 
emphasised the lack of prescriptive guidelines from Hanban and political influence 
from China generally, although it is clear that some guidance exists. Foreign CI 
partners are required to adhere to the “one China policy” and must not have 
collaborative arrangements with Taiwanese universities or be part of any other terms 
that Beijing that finds unacceptable.331 However CIs also reflect the openness of the 
host society, as is the case of the Auckland University CI, which has welcomed 
Taiwanese delegations, but not Falun Gong332 (which is an illegal organisation in 
China). CI class discussions may deal with matters that would be off limits for those 
within China, because the Chinese propaganda system is not as strong in foreign 
countries. Correspondence with 19 individual CI directors reveal that they came diverse 
backgrounds often linked to the local community, with at least one from Taiwan, and
all possessing expertise in the Chinese language.
The CIs are a change in the way the CCP has allowed an organisation not completely 
under its control to be involved in the implementation of foreign policy. The CI follow
earlier Chinese cultural diplomacy such as cultural centres in Europe and other 
locations such as the Maldives, which began in the 1980s and 90s, which were not 
located in learning institutions, and were apparently less successful.333 In order to gain 
credibility for its cultural diplomacy China has had to give the CIs an element of 
political independence, but like the cultural diplomacy of other nations, they are not 
completely separate from political influence.
  
329 Confucius Institutes, “Who are we?” n.d.
330 Ibid.
331 Lai China's Cultural Diplomacy: Going for Soft Power.p. 10.
332 Interview with  Director of Auckland University Confucius Institute,  June 2008
333 Interview with Chinese language lecturer, June 2008.
87
Conclusion
None of the cultural diplomacy programmes of other countries are independent from 
political influence. They all have some form of political, administrative or financial ties 
which guide them in their country’s interests. Britain for example, aims to improve its 
image in countries where it is not well trusted, while France aims to promote French 
influence by supporting French culture in the Francophone world. The Alliance 
Française is largely administratively independent from the French Government but 
receives direction from the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while the Swedish 
Institutes operate with funding and support directly from Sweden’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. France and Britain spend much more money on public diplomacy than China; 
hundreds of millions of US dollars in both cases. Being joint ventures the CIs share the 
costs and leadership between China and a foreign partner, nevertheless, the CIs are an 
important part of the CCP attempts to manage China’s international image.
The Chinese political system is defined by the unique way the Party is interlocked with 
the state bureaucratic sector, and organises bureaucracies to achieve a certain task the 
Party leadership determines. The Party in the contemporary era, derives its legitimacy 
to rule through management of economic development and the management of public 
information. Increasingly, policy discussion in China involves more diversity in 
representation and debate, but in important areas such as the sphere of ideas 
(propaganda and education), security and foreign policy decision-making, a few elites 
retain the power to decide of decisions that affect many. The CCP also exercises power 
in deciding on appointments to senior positions in the state sector, giving it another 
level of control over the Chinese bureaucracy that is often hidden from view to the 
outside.
The CIs are part of the CCP’s propaganda system, in particular the external system 
managed by the EPLG. The CCP has increased the sophistication of its efforts in the 
realm of managing foreign perceptions and opinion. In cultural diplomacy, this has 
meant adopting some of the strategies used by other countries, and compromising in 
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areas that give foreign partners some influence, however this has not altered the Party’s 
management of China’s relations with the rest of the world. Official descriptions 
describe the CI Leadership Council as the ultimate decision-making body, when 
actually, policy decisions are made in leading groups of a few of the most senior Party 
and state officials. The Party leads many organisations involved in information,
broadcasting and entertainment, and can guide others such as the CIs through special 
hidden systems called xitong and “double hatting,” among other mechanisms. 
However, the model of the CIs does give some room for influence from foreigners, 
both in the CI Leadership Council, and local CI boards. 
The CIs have a higher degree of political independence than if they were located in 
China, and they do have foreign influence, but the CCP retains a less than transparent
means of influence. China has adapted foreign models of cultural diplomacy to produce 
the CIs, but the Party continues to manage Chinese cultural diplomacy with its own 
mechanisms. The CIs are analogous to the cultural diplomacy of other developed 
nations – all of which are subject to political influence, the key difference is the 
Chinese Party-State political system.
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Chapter Five
A TOOL FOR SUBVERSION OR A GOODWILL 
GESTURE?
Introduction
China’s attempt to promote its language and culture around the world through the CIs 
has expanded rapidly, but has also been subject to criticism. The criticisms can be 
grouped into the issues of academic freedom and political influence from China. This 
chapter discusses all these concerns in the light of the results of questions put to 
individual directors of CIs, interviews with China specialists, and academic literature. 
The results from these sources suggest that while some of the criticism cannot be 
substantiated, the CIs do present some administrative challenges for the foreign partners 
working with them, and while they represent an increasingly effective Chinese foreign 
policy, they are unlikely to be completely effective in growing China’s soft power. 
However, contributions by CIs to local communities are also apparent; they help 
learning institutions meet their obligations to their communities, and they promote 
greater engagement between China and the rest of the world. 
Research Methodology
The sources for this part of the thesis were taken from a wide variety of sources 
including academic publishing, several online newspapers, a radio broadcast, web 
discussion pages, a questionnaire and personal interviews. An attempt to gain the 
perspective of a representative sample of CI Directors was, unfortunately unsuccessful, 
with a only minority of those sent questionnaires actually responding with answers to 
the questions. A list of the email addresses of 122 CIs was complied through inquires, 
which amounted to 46% of the 260 CIs operating at the time (requests for a complete 
list though official sources were declined). Ten questions were sent to them which 
asked for example: “Who set up your institute? Do you feel you have academic 
independence?”, and “In what way does your CI benefit the community?” Participation 
was voluntary and confidential, and involved a one month timeframe (May 2008) with 
two reminders sent at 15 days and three days before the end of the month. The result 
was that 15.6% of those surveyed actually replied, which represented 7% of total 
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directors of CIs existing at the time. A further 15 of the addresses or 12.3% proved to be 
invalid, and one director replied saying they were too busy to respond. 
The directors who did reply to the questions stressed their independence from Chinese 
political influence, but the silent majority who did not reply also send a message as 
strong, if not stronger than those that did. There was an apparent reluctance on the part 
of many CI directors and of some interview subjects, to speak freely on matters 
concerning the Chinese Government. This makes it difficult to say that most CI 
directors feel independent from Chinese political influence.
Although the replies cannot be used as a representative sample of CI directors, they 
provide a valuable gauge of individuals’ perspectives. Qualitative surveys with low 
response rates cannot be regarded as reliable enough to make generalisations, but they 
can still be useful indications of individual perceptions and experiences. According to 
Floyd Flowers’ book on research methods, “Failure to collect data from a high 
percentage of those selected to be surveyed is a major potential source of survey 
error.” 334 Because the CIs are relatively new and little other comparative work 
analysing the views of CI directors exists, information gained from the responses can 
still be useful; as the results provide a rich and detailed picture of the experiences and 
perceptions of the individuals involved. 
Criticisms relating to universities
Criticisms of the CIs portray them as a threat to the integrity of foreign universities. In a 
speech available online335 and a journal article, Jocelyn Chey argues that the CIs are a 
threat to academic freedom because of their “ever-expanding focus and links to the 
CCP”, and it is important to protect universities from “contextual association and 
pressure” arising out of the CIs involvement in research, academic conferences and 
teaching. 336 She states:
The CI programme insofar as it supports culture and outreach is most 
valuable. It would be when it seeks to engage in teaching or research as 
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part of universities main activities that academic colleagues should be 
aware of potential bias.337
As an example of how the Chinese Government uses the CIs to promote favourable 
points of view, Chey notes the Nordic CI in Stockholm University. It sponsored a 
seminar on “The Development of China and Its Role in the Globe” in November 2006, 
which was summarised in a report on the Hanban website as; “reaching a favourable 
conclusion to the question whether China’s development had brought threats or 
opportunities to the world.”338 Chey argues that academics should be wary of this kind 
of “contextual association and pressure.”339 She argues that scholars around the world 
research China from a variety of disciplines and generally reach fair, comprehensive 
and unbiased conclusions, but should the CIs develop more of a research focus such as 
the establishment of a research based CI at Waseda University in Japan,340 the result 
would be “at best be a dumbing down of research and, at worst, could produce 
propaganda.”341
Chey was also concerned about the unequal power relationship between universities 
and the Chinese authorities when negotiating agreements, and why China has chosen to 
establish the CIs in learning institutions that were based on academic neutrality. The 
expansion is occurring at a time when many universities are under financial pressure 
and accepting a CI can be a means of cutting the costs of delivering Chinese language 
education and competing for the fees of international students, while the CIs were 
backed by the Chinese Party-State system. She asked, “Why do the CIs have to be in 
universities when Alliance Française and the Goethe Institute can function 
separately?”342
CI Directors who responded to my email questionnaire believed they could have 
academic independence although some acknowledged that they did feel constraints as a 
result of their relationship with China. According to one director, “In world CI 
meetings, some European universities have shared the experience of conflict between 
their CI and their Chinese Department. The latter can be critical of China, and they 
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wonder what perception will be created if their department/university criticises China in 
an academic forum, and at the same time host the CI.”343
Another director stated they had academic independence but, “it is clear that some 
topics are not dealt with (such as the Tibet or the Taiwan issue).”344 Another stated that 
in his publications he had never been very apologetic to the current Chinese 
Government and “once I’ve [sic] got a phone call from the Embassy asking what do I 
think about our university granting the Dalai Lama [an] Honorary Degree. I’ve 
answered that is none of my business, our CI is an apolitical unit.”345 One respondent 
answered that as Director he did not have complete academic independence as 
independence is a relative term; 
From Hanban/the Chinese Government? Yes, absolutely. If the question 
refers to independence from my university, of course not. The CI has to fit 
into the academic and research priorities of the university. This does limit 
some of the projects we can get involved in, as we are employees of the 
university.346
While there appears to be some constraints on CI Directors due to their institutes’
relationship with China (and other partners), most of the 19 CI Directors who replied to 
my questionnaire felt that they certainly had operational independence and stated that 
they as Director, had responsibility for programme planning, financing, and staffing. 
Most CIs are primarily involved in community language tuition (while based in a 
learning institution) rather than academic social science research on China. The CIs 
constitution lists promoting Chinese language and culture as their main aim,347 while 
promoting academic research on China is not mentioned as one of its goals. Some 
universities have the same staff involved in academic China Studies as well as language 
teaching through the CI. One of them stated, “Academic freedom is not an issue 
because the focus of the Institute is the promotion of language and culture. For 
academic research, we do it under another “identity”, which is the University’s China 
Studies Programme.”348 A university Chinese language teacher interviewed supported 
the establishment of a CI within their department as a means of enhancing Chinese 
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language teaching in secondary schools in the locality. They went on to say that 
academic freedom was not a major issue because while China may be able to control 
one or two institutes, it would not be able to control them all, “and universities would 
not allow it.”349
China is not the only organisation competing for influence on academic staff and 
complicating their academic independence. In addition to the numerous commercial and 
state interests which collaborate with universities, several countries also have a cultural 
diplomacy presence on campuses worldwide in the form of language institutes, support 
for country studies and educational exchanges (such as the US-backed Fulbright 
Programme). Portugal’s Instituto Camões for example, uses a similar model to the CIs 
on a smaller scale. 350 According to Professor of Chinese Studies Tim Wright, an 
executive board member of the CI at Sheffield University, China is a less democratic 
country than the UK or Germany and the relationship between universities and the 
government in China is less independent than in Europe. However, Wright stated that 
the CI he works with had been given a free rein to come to whatever conclusions about 
China that it wanted to.351
While some foreigners working directly with CIs are not greatly troubled about 
academic independence issues, they are concerned about the institutes long-term 
survivability. Don Starr notes an online discussion on the public site H-Asia in June 
2008, where academic staff involved with CIs at their institutions took a relaxed view 
towards the issue of academic freedom.352 They stated that the textbooks provided by 
Hanban “were so transparent in their propaganda that they were no threat to student 
minds. Nor were they aware of any attempts to censor lectures or courses, which they 
felt would be counter-productive for the Chinese.353 The staff working with CIs tended 
to have other concerns about the CIs however, focusing on finance, legal issues, 
relations with the Chinese university, and long-term support.
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Does the Chinese Government tell you how to teach the Chinese language?
Like the last section, the vocal minority of individual directors who responded to the 
question about interference from China on teaching did not think it was a major issue. 
Directors were asked to respond to the quote from G. Cameron Hurst, Director of the 
Centre for East Asia Studies at the University of Pennsylvania in the Christian Science 
Monitor of January 4, 2007, that he didn’t want to be “in the business of the Chinese 
Government telling us how” to teach the Chinese language. This question brought 
detailed responses. The theme of the 19 directors who chose to comment was that the 
Chinese authorities did not interfere with teaching; “I don’t look at their government 
telling us what to do – it’s more of what we can do for each other.”354 Another 
respondent emphasised their basic purpose: to promote the Chinese language 
throughout the world. Directors who were questioned said that there is no mandatory 
curriculum or method, and there is a wide variety of materials and methodologies 
available for each Confucius Institute to choose from, “To be fair to the CI 
headquarters, they are not “telling us how to teach Chinese” but only making all kinds 
of resources available to us.”355
Several directors emphasised they were free to teach Chinese to their communities in 
whatever way they chose, but they were the minority who actually responded to a 
questionnaire. One Director stated that the Chinese Government had not infringed on 
their operational and educational approach; “We have made it clear we would not work 
under those conditions.”356 However, for some universities, the chance to introduce a 
Chinese language service albeit with Chinese backing is better than none at all; “As a 
developing country, and one with very few human resources when it comes to teaching 
Mandarin Chinese, the assistance of Hanban is very welcome.”357
Staff seconded from the Chinese partner university may not be familiar with local 
teaching methods. Another respondent stated that G. Cameron Hurst was “partially 
right” in that Chinese approach to teaching to foreigners “left much to be desired,” and 
while Russian study of China had been undertaken for several centuries, China only 
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stated producing learning systems for non-native speakers of Chinese in the 1980s.358
Further, another respondent said; 
It is absolutely understandable that he does not want to commit himself to 
the activity which smacks of China’s propaganda effort. And he is right. 
For us – and I believe most of the universities establishing CIs – it’s a 
chance for developing our China studies. But we are all too aware how 
narrow our path is. We are, to some extent, seen as a propaganda tool. And 
in fact, we are … So the problem is how true is the information provided 
by us. I believe we haven’t compromised our academic position so far.”359
One respondent thought it was inappropriate to frame the Confucius Institutes 
programme as government policy, rather than Ministry of Education policy. They 
continued “If he is really interested in teaching Chinese, then he will learn from all 
good ideas, whether they come from the Chinese Ministry of Education or not.”360 The 
reality of the tight financial circumstances many Western universities find themselves in 
was touched on by the comment “Many of the institutions hosting CIs don’t have [a lot] 
of money floating around, and the CI allows them to make significant investments in a 
programme that they might not otherwise be able to afford.”361
The changing role of universities
China’s promotion of the CIs is occurring at a time of changing roles for learning 
institutions. Traditionally, universities were a source of education for the professions: 
theology, law and medicine, and were entrusted with the task of undertaking research 
for the social good, where academics were free to express any opinion in order to 
advance science or their discipline. With neo-liberal reforms in the beginning across the 
world in the 1980s and 90s, a more profit-orientated model has emerged, in which 
universities provide more of their own funding, compete with other educational 
institutions for students, and undertake commercially focused research. As Philip 
Altbach has described, the values existing in the market place have intruded onto the 
campus.362 Universities and other tertiary learning institutions are expected to generate 
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more of their own funding; they have had to “think more like businesses and less like 
learning institutions.”363
Other foreign governments have also become involved in educational institutions 
through public diplomacy such as supporting country studies programmes and 
scholarships for language studies. One such example is the National Centre for 
Research on Europe at the University of Canterbury, where according to the Director 
Martin Holland, the European Union provide funds for research, with the aim to 
promote understanding, rather than direct a positive picture of Europe.364 Increasingly 
universities have partnerships with commercial organisations for whom the research 
opportunities can translate into commercial gain for the country, the company and the 
university. 
According to Altbach, universities need to maintain an adequate degree of academic 
freedom and independence if they are to flourish, and every country needs to maintain 
control over their academic institutions.365 The diversification of funding of universities 
has not always led to an improvement in their performance also argues Fang Zhao.366 It 
is argued that the assessment of education quality should include the achievement of 
both economic and social goals, and both the achievement of short-term benefits and 
the long term interests of a nation.367 Traditionally universities were regarded as special 
institutions by society precisely because their goals went beyond everyday 
commerce.368 The changes that have allowed a diversification of funding sources have 
been controversial but have made universities become more efficient and made their 
research more socially and commercially relevant. This is one of factors that has 
allowed China to introduce the Confucius Institutes into universities, because of the 
extra funds they provide. Zhao argues that the real test should be whether or not an 
external funding source helps the university achieve short and long term social and 
economic goals.369
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Administrative issues
For many foreigners working with CIs, the problems are not so much political or 
academic, but more everyday administrative issues. These include basic issues such as 
that the institutes could be a long-term financial risk to foreign learning institutions. 
Beijing has helped set up many joint venture CIs, but whether they have too much 
independence and may be unable to function without continued subsidies is an issue for 
many existing institutes. The start up funding from Hanban of $US 50-100,000 covers 
the period of the initial five-year agreement,370 but the activities of most CIs do not 
produce an income stream sufficient to cover costs.371 According to Professor Tim 
Wright of Sheffield University, the expectation that the institutes will self-fund after 
three years is unrealistic: “The Chinese Government has to accept that these institutes 
will require funding for a substantial period of time, 10 to 20 years perhaps.”372
Practical concerns to do with legal issues and regulations dealing with relations between 
the foreign university and the Chinese university partner have also been expressed by 
some of those in working relationships with CIs. University managers have been 
persuaded that the CI arrangement will provide benefits such as prestige, new 
opportunities, research collaboration and fee-paying Chinese students, but if these do 
not eventuate, then there will be pressure to withdraw after the initial period.373 The visa 
and tax status of incoming teachers have been issues, and in some cases “they don’t 
understand Western culture and different places, with the result that they can’t teach in 
a way that reflects student’s needs.”374 The legal status of a CI which is subject to 
Chinese requirements, as well as having administrative and financial requirements to its 
foreign partner, may also be an issue.375
CIs location within universities
The CI programme establishes a partnership with foreign learning institutions
(especially universities), because this relationship gives them more respectability than 
they would have if they were located elsewhere in local communities. Establishing the 
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Auckland CI in a university gives it more “authority and kudos” than it would have if it 
was located anywhere else according to its director.376 However, in creating this model, 
China has had to meet requirements of the host country and universities. This has meant 
satisfying concerns about independence, freedom and authority. Professor of Political 
Science Wenran Jiang of Alberta University supports giving China a chance to put its 
perspective it the established format, while observing whether it does try to use the 
institutes coercively as critics have suggested.377  
CIs operate with varying degrees of independence from academic Chinese language 
schools in the host university. Jocelyn Chey was especially concerned that the CI would 
be “integrated” with undergraduate and postgraduate programmes delivered by Sydney 
University, and this would compromise its academic integrity.378 Accordingly, the CI 
was housed in Sydney University’s Research Institute for Asia and the Pacific when it 
was opened in March 2008, physically separate from university Chinese teaching 
programmes. In other universities CIs have been involved in teaching university credit 
courses. Professor John Hearne, Sydney University’s deputy Vice Chancellor said that 
academic programmes of the Chinese Studies Department would continue unchanged, 
but left open the possibility of “innovation” as “people get more comfortable” with 
arrangements.379
Having a CI located in a university gives the institute greater integration into local 
communities than their predecessor Chinese cultural centres had. According to one 
source, earlier attempts by China to promote its language and culture through cultural 
centres located in foreign cities (Chinese cultural centres were established in Europe in 
the 1990s380), proved unsuccessful because they had few connections, and were unable 
to function.381 The same source stated that Chinese universities were asked to promote 
CIs through their links with foreign universities, because foreign universities are seen as 
objective and having links with local communities. 
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A potential for difficulties does appear to arise when CIs become closely integrated into 
a university’s teaching programmes, especially where there are existing China studies 
programmes in place. According to a post by Dr. Michael Carl Brose of the University 
of Wyoming in the June 2008 H-Asia public discussion on the CIs and academic 
independence, CIs that have become involved in university credit teaching have run 
into problems.382 These may include “turf wars” with existing Chinese courses, and 
difficulties in holding CI staff administratively and financially accountable.383 There are 
a number of cases where this appears to have been successfully achieved, but separating 
CIs from academic teaching and research while remaining with a university is the 
approach some institutions have taken.
Managing the establishment process
While the number of successful CI applications continues to grow, there has also been 
an even greater number of unsuccessful applications. The reasons have included 
restrictions placed by another CI, unwillingness to subject the learning institution to any 
form of control from China, and the establishment of alternative China studies facilities.
A Chinese language lecturer stated that one CI was enough for a country such as New 
Zealand with a population of four million people, despite the efforts of several second 
and third tier Chinese universities that had been involved in trying to sell CIs 
partnerships to each New Zealand university. 384 According to Xiaolin Guo, a real 
incentive for Chinese universities to undertake CI projects is to boost their academic 
credentials, because “international activities” serve as an index on which China’s 
learning institutes are evaluated.385
Some of the most prestigious universities in the world have not established CIs. 
According to Starr,
The reasons for this are clear: the very top foreign universities do not need 
to encumber themselves with the negative aspects of a CI in the hope of 
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gaining official favour and collaborative access to China’s top universities; 
they can have these for their asking.386
For example, negotiations to establish a CI at the University of British Columbia in 
Vancouver Canada, ranked 33 in the world in the Times Education Supplement top 200 
universities, 387 were unsuccessful (despite the university’s Chinese language 
department being involved in the writing of Hanban language teaching textbooks) 
because the University declined the application.388 However, a CI was later opened at 
the British Columbia Institute of Technology (BCIT) also in Vancouver, which is not 
ranked at all in the Times Education Supplement top 200 universities.389
Cultural and linguistic concerns
The CIs have been criticised in the West by some sinologists for projecting a restricted 
view of Chinese culture. Although each CI is given substantial independence in how it 
organises its programme, there is some concern about what culture can be represented 
given the less than democratic political system existing in China. In personal 
communication with the author, a Senior Lecturer in Chinese expressed disquiet about 
the way a particular CI at has tended to undermine and compete with existing and often 
community based Chinese activities, and its tendency to portray itself as the sole 
authority on not just Chinese language but culture as well.390 This was “supremely 
ironic, given the plight of [Chinese culture] particularly in the PRC.”391 According to 
this scholar, “the issue boils down to one of who owns the Chinese language and the 
nature of discourse of Chinese history and culture.”392
Chinese culture in the mainland has been closely connected to the political climate of 
the time. Scholar Geremie Barmé describes culture in the mainland since 1949 suffering 
and prospering according to the dictates of political leaders.393 The situation came about 
because the CCP regarded culture as merely another weapon in the war of class 
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struggle. CCP cultural policies were designed to support the “advanced culture” of 
Marxism-Leninism and destroy the “old culture” of traditional Chinese civilisation such 
as Confucianism. During the three decades of Mao’s rule, artists learned the great 
personal costs involved in becoming part of an elite given the task of educating and 
enlightening the masses; experiencing highs of exhalation and lows of repression. 
Culture in the mainland has operated in a “velvet prison”, the boundaries of which have 
expanded during the reform and open period.394 The post 1978 era has seen increased 
cultural freedom, however in the aftermath of the 1989 disturbances, Jiang Zemin 
sought to tighten management of culture.395 Subjects such as the Cultural Revolution, 
which occurred during the Party’s rule and resulted with widespread devastation, 
remain managed by authorities. 396
Ownership of language
Efforts by successive governments to use language policies to unify the nation have 
been one of the tools to used govern China for centuries. The concept of the “Chinese 
language” encompasses linguistic phenomena so broad as to make the concept virtually 
meaningless except politically, because it actually consists of six mutually unintelligible 
languages.397 Mandarin or Putonghua (also known as Hanyu) is the largest with 679 
million native speakers.398 Efforts to promote a national language were given impetus 
by the New Culture movement in 1916, and the Kuomintang (KMT) government 
“implemented sweeping language reforms that reflected the ideologies of the new 
era”.399 Both the CCP and the KMT promoted Mandarin in an effort to unify the 
country. The CCP’s language policies have had the effect of promoting the languages of 
the majority Han Chinese ethnicity over the languages of other Chinese ethnic groups, 
and promoting Mandarin over other Han languages such as Cantonese and 
Shanghainese, even if this was not the official objective.
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Chinese dissident Chen Yonglin who defected from the Chinese embassy in Sydney 
Australia where he was stationed in 2005, stated that the use of simplified Chinese 
characters in the CIs was intended to promote a communist view of history, and that 
foreigners should be aware that China was using culture to penetrate mainstream 
society.400 However, this view that Chinese authorities were trying to control what 
people knew about China through the use of simplified characters did not have much 
credibility according to Professor Wenran Jiang of Alberta University who stated that 
many academics in China can read traditional characters, and that simplified characters 
are used because they are easier to learn.401 Factors in favour of the CIs focus on 
standard Mandarin, are that it is spoken by the vast majority of Chinese, and the 
simplified characters have assisted with improving literacy in the mainland. 
The politics of linguistic competition
While China has been successful in developing the popularity of Mandarin Chinese, it 
is not without its competition from other languages spoken in China and by overseas
Chinese. Modern China is highly linguistically diverse with many different ethnic 
groups, and even more indistinguishable dialects. Hayden Windrow has discussed 
China’s use of language policies to shape, and even create the self-awareness of the 
nation.402 Successive Chinese regimes in the last century have sought to use linguistic 
policies to enforce their vision of Chinese nationalism. Prior to coming to power the 
CCP had a liberal policy on language favouring linguistic independence for China’s 
non-Han people, the preservation of all Han languages, and using Mandarin only as a 
common language to ease communication.403 However, on coming to power in 1949 
the CCP language policies have centralised authority through promoting Mandarin over 
other Han languages which officially became “barriers to national unity”.404 Beijing’s 
reformed language policy also involved the promotion of a simplified version of 
Chinese characters using the Roman alphabet called pinyin which was aimed at 
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improving literacy amongst Chinese, 90% of whom could not understand traditional 
characters in 1949.405  
In mainland China there has been competition between Chinese language dialects. As 
Windrow has noted, the economic growth in China’s wealthier regions such as 
Guangdong, Fujian and Shanghai has fostered growth in their languages, seemingly in 
opposition to the Chinese government attempts to promote Mandarin as the national 
language.406 However Beijing has legislated to promote the speaking of Mandarin, 
requiring its use in the government operations, and ensuring all civil servants pass a test 
of Mandarin ability.407 In the mainland, the future of other Han languages is bleak 
because of the government’s pro-Mandarin policies.408
In Taiwan where the Nationalist Government had promoted Mandarin as the national 
language, democratisation since the 1980s has encouraged the long-suppressed use of 
non-Mandarin Chinese languages. During Taiwanese elections, whether a candidate can 
speak “local” languages was an indication of how sympathetic they are to the
Taiwanese independence cause.409 The KMT imposed one party rule in Taiwan after 
1949 but a multi-party political system developed in the 1980s. The Democratic 
Progressive Party has consistently pushed its cultural localisation (such as the speaking 
of local languages) as a means of advancing its goal of advancing an independent 
Taiwan.410 This divergent trend is something the mainland government is determined to 
oppose. 
The promotion of Mandarin is seen as a threat to the linguistic and cultural identities 
which have been fiercely guarded by diasporic Chinese communities, many of whom 
speak other Chinese languages. This especially true for Cantonese speakers in 
Vancouver, New York or San Francisco and other sites of early Chinese immigration 
where the introduction of Mandarin schools is seen as a threat to their century-old 
identities. This “dialectic maelstrom” may pose a continuous, if not insurmountable 
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problem for the development of China’s language policies. 411 But many overseas 
Chinese from a non-Mandarin background are taking up learning Mandarin, adding to 
its global popularity. The CIs have a goal of creating 100 million non-native speakers of 
Mandarin by 2020.
Propaganda or public diplomacy?
Some critics do not regard the CIs as analogous to the language institutes which are part 
of the public diplomacy of other countries, such as Alliance Française or the Goethe 
Institute due to the degree of government control over administration and operations.412
Taiwanese and Falon Gong sources also describe the CIs as propaganda tools of the 
CCP.413 While there are some differences such as structure and funding in the language 
institutes that are part of cultural diplomacy, the CIs have much in common with other 
language institutes. 414 Several of the 19 CI Directors who responded to my 
questionnaire indicated that Chinese authorities exercise only distant influence over the 
administration and operations of their CIs. Similarly according to one news story, 
“Some program [sic] directors (all American) joke that, for once, they want Hanban to 
provide more central guidance.”415
Several university staff involved with CIs in Britain dispute that the CIs are an outlet for 
CCP propaganda. The Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lampeter in the United 
Kingdom, Professor of Law Robert Pearce stated, “We have seen no evidence of the 
Chinese government using the university as a propaganda tool through the CI.”416
Similarly, according to Tim Wright, Professor of Chinese Studies and executive board 
member of the CI at Sheffield University, China is a less democratic country than 
Britain or Germany, but “We are given more or less a free reign to do what we want. 
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Someone who wished to undermine China may not be welcome at a CI, but the British 
Council doesn’t exactly put on talks on the IRA.” 417
There has been renewed interest in government activities to influence foreign public 
opinion (described as public diplomacy), but while techniques have changed from early 
propaganda, the only difference may be the political system that the activity represents.
Aoyama argues that the two terms are different, as public diplomacy emphasises 
openness and accuracy of information provided, while propaganda conveys the image 
of distortion and coercion. 418 However, the effect of both activities is in fact the same, 
as both aim to influence audience opinion. According to Aoyama, information 
conveyed by a democratic government tends to be reviewed and debated by other 
domestic factors such as social groups and the media, while information conveyed by a 
authoritarian regime does not. As a result of such a check and balance process, public 
diplomacy builds trust and interactive communication. 419 The underlying political 
system therefore, has a mediating effect on any presentation a government makes about 
its national culture (and language).420 Public diplomacy emanating from countries with 
an authoritarian form of government that is less tolerant of social diversity, will not 
portray an as accurate picture of the country’s culture, meaning that the public 
diplomacy/propaganda will be less effective.421
Subversion
Some are concerned that China will use the CIs to conduct improper influence, 
industrial espionage and surveillance of Chinese living abroad.422 The most public 
expression of such concern so far, was the raising of the issue in the Swedish 
Parliament in March 2008. This was a result of some staff at Stockholm University, 
where the Nordic CI is located claiming that the Chinese Embassy in Stockholm was 
using the CI to carry out political surveillance, covert propaganda and inhibit research 
on sensitive areas such as Falun Gong and Tibetan independence. The CI Director 
categorically refuted the suggestions, and the Rector of the university, on the basis on 
an independent assessment also rejected the claims that the CI was being used for 
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political purposes, however he accepted a suggestion that a different format for the CI 
within the University be explored. The issue was raised in the Swedish Parliament 
where a member compared the CIs to Mussolini’s Italian Institutes of the 1930s and 
expressed extreme concern about the Nordic Institute.423
There was also controversy about the opening of a CI in Vancouver, Canada with some 
saying it is “part of a plot by an emerging superpower to infiltrate and influence foreign 
citizens and their governments” while others claimed it was a goodwill gesture by 
Beijing to teach the Chinese language and culture.424 A prominent Canadian lawyer 
who specialises in immigration and human rights law, David Matas, has argued that 
some CIs have become “spy citadels” for the Chinese Government, and others have 
been involved in trying to control protests and activities of certain groups such as Falun 
Gong and those of overseas Chinese.425 According to Matas,
Nominally, [the institutes] are just about Chinese studies . . . but informally 
they become a vehicle that the Chinese government uses to basically 
intimidate the academic institutions to run according to their guise and also 
as a vehicle for infiltration and spying into the campuses to find out what's 
going on hostile to their interest.426
There has been criticism that the CIs are an extension of Chinese government influence 
and an expression of Chinese soft power in a subversive manner. For example, a report 
by the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) released to the Canadian 
Broadcasting Service (CBS) stated that the CIs were part of a Chinese effort to win 
Western hearts and minds as opposed to a goodwill gesture to teach Chinese language 
and culture.427 The report noted the establishment of CIs in Canada in the context of 
monitoring Chinese intelligence operations in the country, and stated that the institutes 
will play a greater role in China’s foreign relations in the future.428
Industrial espionage has also been suggested to be one of the activities of CIs. A 
newspaper report noted that in many countries, discreet partners have been established 
between CIs and Chinese high technology groups, for example: Zheng Baoyong, vice-
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president of China’s Huawei Technologies sits on the Board of the CI at the University 
of Texas located in Dallas, a hub in the US technology sector.429 A French CI is located 
in Poitiers, a city associated with information technology, and according to the report 
the CI is backed by Chinese firm ZTE Technologies. 430 The Poitiers CI has a 
partnership with Nanchang University where ZTE engineers are trained in China. 
According to the article, US counterintelligence has concerns that the CIs are being 
used as a link for the transfer of technology to China.431
There is little evidence to support claims that the CIs are involved in subversion. 
Several academic studies do describe the CIs as having political implications but in the 
field of public diplomacy which works through persuasion rather than subversion.432
The fact that many CI Directors are locals with a speciality in Chinese language, and 
the joint venture nature of CIs which contain a compliment of local people including 
host university, tends to count against their use for espionage.433 Rather than competing 
for industrial intelligence, the real competition appears to be in the field of influence on 
world public opinion.
Exclusion of dissidents
Some critics have questioned whether CIs would exclude Chinese dissidents,434 but it 
appears that such people would be extended freedoms similar to those existing in the 
local societies. 122 CI directors were asked what they would do if critics of the Chinese 
government such as Free Tibet, Falun Gong or pro-Taiwanese independence groups 
wanted to be involved in their institute. 19 Directors responded to this question, and 
while one said that they would not allow it, most of the replies stated that they work to 
maintain academic independence, and they would not stop members of such groups 
from attending classes (provided they did not use the CI to promote political 
arguments). According to one director, should dissidents attempt to raise their particular 
concerns in or using the institute, they would not be welcome; 
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If a faculty researcher wanted to draw upon resources of the institute to 
examine in academic research China’s religious policy, for example, there 
would be no problem. If someone wanted to use the name of the institute to 
make political arguments, we wouldn’t be able to allow it.435
One Director was more precise; 
When I asked our co-operating university about co-operating with some 
activities with private institutions. They said that as long as these are not 
free Tybet [sic], FLG, or Free Taiwan groups [they] have no objections. 
We obviously cannot help them with their activities, but we are certainly 
not going to protest against them. Next week there is going to be a public 
debate about Tibet and I have been invited as one of the speakers.436
Chinese embassies in foreign capitals may be involved in more political issues such as 
those described by PRC embassy defector Chen Yonglin, who claimed much of his 
work as a Chinese embassy officer in Australia was spent targeting “the five evils”: 
Falon Gong, Taiwan, democracy, Tibet, and the Uighur independence movement.437
However the CIs are not embassies, and have a completely different management 
structure. Another director responded that no university administration would allow 
itself to become involved with such political groups, with or without a CI; 
The official positions of all major Western governments is that Tibet is a 
part of China and Taiwan is not an independent nation. Why would a 
university organization engage activities that are against the official policy 
of its own government politically? Academic studies of these campaigns 
are an entirely different matter and we should do what we want to do”.438
It is clear that the CIs do recognise official Chinese government positions, but also that 
operating in foreign countries, CIs have more freedom than organisations within China 
would have in relating to foreign organisations and individuals, some of whom may 
hold views different to those of the CCP. This is style is reflected in language institutes 
of other nations.
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An attempt to gain soft power?
Many educators in the Chinese language education field do not accept that the CIs are 
anything to do with politics or soft power, however some senior Chinese politicians do 
state that the CIs are part of Chinese attempts to gain soft power. This indicates a degree 
of sensitivity as to how the CIs are presented to the world.439  Many studies describe the 
CIs in the context of soft power diplomacy.440 However, individuals working with the 
CIs tended to see them in an educational context rather than a political one, as Allison 
Markin a spokesperson for the BCIT in Vancouver said “We are an educational 
institute, so its not something we look at in a political vein, or any sort of security vein. 
What we are really doing is providing education to people.”441 Similarly, a director of 
an Australian CI stated in an email to the author the institutes had “no political agenda” 
as far as he was aware.442
In contrast to the directors, senior Chinese officials do recognise the CIs as part of 
China’s objective of national development and enhancement of its soft power. 
According to Du Ruiqing, former president of the Xi’an International Studies 
University, misconceptions that China’s development will be a threat to the rest of the 
world, will be overcome when foreigners are exposed to traditional Chinese culture 
which values harmony; “culture is a soft power that effectively penetrates to the quench 
misunderstanding and hostility between people of different races.”443 Hanban Director 
Xu Lin was also quoted as saying “the CIs would become a shining example of China’s 
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soft power”.444 During a visit to Hanban’s office in Beijing, Li Changchun, one of the 
nine members of the Standing Committee of the Politburo (the apex of political 
authority in China), and in charge of ideology and propaganda, stated that the 
development of the CIs
Is an important channel to glorify Chinese culture, to help Chinese culture
spread to the world [which is] part of Chinese’s foreign propaganda 
strategy.445
Chinese officials involved with the CIs downplay claims that China is using the CIs to 
impose the China model of development on the rest of the world. In a recent statement, 
CI Leadership Council Chair Liu Yandong (also a CCP Politburo member), stated that 
some Western media and commentators have suggested that the CIs are part of a plan to 
infiltrate the Chinese model of development into other countries, but stated that this is 
not the case.446 Liu stated that the CIs are only promoting the Chinese language, and 
argued that each country is free to choose its own model of development - in 
accordance with the Confucian idea of he er bu tong; that different cultures can exist 
side by side.447 Lui stressed her view of soft power that is largely made up of cultural 
attractiveness.448
Given the dichotomy between Chinese language educators and senior Chinese 
politicians, it seems that China is taking great care about how it presents the CIs. Given 
the concerns about the threat posed to academic independence, marketing the CIs as 
purely educational, as many Chinese language educators see them, seems a safer 
approach than associating them with soft power or a conscious projection of Chinese 
political interests.449
Many assessments of the CIs recognise that they are part of a Chinese government 
effort to gain soft power, but have downplayed any threat that they may pose. The CSIS 
report from Canada observes that while academics debate the relative importance of 
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hard verses soft power, China views the concept of soft power as very useful, and once 
the Beijing Olympics are over, the Confucius Institutes will “take a more prominent 
place in China’s efforts to increase its standing in the world”.450 A US Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) study notes China’s increasing soft power of cultural influence, 
increasing foreign investments and international aid, but stated that these investments 
are coming from a very low base and are still low compared to the US. According to 
then Senator Joseph Biden who commissioned the study, “Contrary to some projections 
of China’s ability to displace American influence, the CRS study indicates that China 
must grapple with many limitations on its influence.”451
To many in Westernised countries, China still has a long was to go to achieve the level 
of soft power that would attract and influence much of the world’s population. 
Contemporary China has many problems associated with its international image 
associated with food safety, human rights and medical crises. The images of “tank man” 
defying People’s Liberation Army tanks not long after they had crushed student 
demonstrators on 4 June 1989,452 is still in the minds of many foreigners when they 
think of China, something it is striving to address by presenting the “civilised” side of 
Chinese culture. Wenran Jiang of the University of Alberta argues that China has had 
an image problem in highly developed countries because of a “democracy deficit,”453
which is gradually improving. He does not see the CIs as propaganda tools, a term he 
describes as having secretive and subversive connotations in English; China is just 
trying to promote its perspective through its culture which is something many counties 
do.454
Positive contributions
There are clearly many ways the CIs benefit local communities according to the 
responses from several directors and university administrators, indicating their success 
in improving China’s image. One CI director stated that they provided the following 
services to the community; “Chinese language classes for people who could not get into 
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the university credit courses, translation and consulting services for people who do 
business or travel and study in China, setting up an information centre, and organising 
exchange programs for academic and business purposes.”455 Asked what benefits a CI 
would bring to his university, former University of Canterbury Vice-Chancellor Roy 
Sharp said that it would help the university provide educational services to its wider 
community (such as local businesspeople doing business with China), and further 
existing links with educational institutions in Christchurch’s Chinese sister-city, 
Wuhan. Another benefit would be helping the university’s Chinese language 
department  work with local Chinese language high school teachers. 
Responses from communication with a minority of CI directors provided a number of 
definitions of success. More than one respondent mentioned that their Confucius 
Institute provided services not otherwise available to the community, such as the CI 
brand, the opportunity to join summer camps in Chinese universities, a well balanced 
syllabus and the HSK language proficiency test; all in one place. The CI brand indicates 
a standard that has been reached and approval from the CI leadership council, 
something that is sold as membership as an elite club, particularly in the initial 
stages.456 Other CI directors mentioned such benefits to their communities as creating a 
meeting ground between local Chinese and their neighbours of other cultural heritages, 
demystifying Chinese culture, and improving understanding of Chinese society. Factors 
determining a CIs success included how many activities were staged and how the 
students perceive them;
All major events organised by CI [sic](master-class in Chinese calligraphy, 
Chinese martial arts show, Traditional [sic]music performance etc) are 
covered by local media. That gives people a notion that we are not just a 
language school, but something bigger.457
These responses gave an indication of the individual character each institute, because it 
has been allowed to develop individual programmes to suit its community. For one, 
success would be “if we significantly raise the capacity of the university to offer 
advanced Chinese language classes, raise the amount and quality of academic research 
on China within our university, and if we are able to build increased interest in 
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engaging China.”458 Other responses stated that success could be measured by the 
training of local teachers so that they can offer Mandarin in their schools/colleges. A 
respondent stated that the relationship with the partner Chinese university has benefited 
students and teachers from both countries who have participated in exchanges. Another 
response was that the partnership benefited the university, and the country in terms of 
promoting Chinese language in mainstream society. Other measures of success would 
be an ability to generate an income, and raising the university profile. From the 
responses of a small number of directors who responded to my questionnaire, it is clear 
that the presence of a CI had deepened the level of engagement between China and their
local communities.
Conclusion
The rapid development of the CIs across the world has been marked by some resistance. 
The issues of whether the CIs are a threat to academic independence and even a tool for 
Chinese political subversion, have met the expansion of the CIs into universities many 
developed democracies. Most scholarly assessments suggest that the CIs are designed to 
promote Chinese influence rather than subversion. Other concerns relating to the 
definition of Chinese language and culture, and financial stability once CIs are 
established have considerable foundation. The CCP attaches great importance to 
managing the sphere of people’s ideas, and the presentation of Chinese culture and 
language in the CIs is influenced by the domestic political context. 
The location of CIs within universities has been the cause of some fear that the Chinese 
Government would use them to influence or control the study of China and its 
language. Universities were chosen in China’s CI model because they have an image of 
being independent and objective, this gives the CIs greater authority and connection to 
the community, something previous Chinese cultural centres lacked.459 In return for 
setting up CIs, China has had to accept obligations of host universities, such as 
protecting academic independence and the other objectives of each institution. While 
the CIs are not independent from the Chinese political system as chapter five showed, 
most universities world-wide are adapting to new roles involving the 
internationalisation of education, and a business model involving commercial 
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partnerships and diversified sources of funding. Independence is a relative term, and 
while universities in China may be less independent than in developed democracies, a 
CI is not independent from the priorities of the university in which it operates. 
Academic independence is but one of the many issues universities must take into 
account when deciding whether a CI will advance the institution’s short and long term 
social and economic goals.
While academic independence is not considered to be an insurmountable issue for many 
of those Western academics working with CIs, it has been a factor in a few elite 
universities declining invitations to host a CI. But for those foreigners working with 
CIs, administrative issues such the long-term survival of the established institutes are a 
greater concern. These issues relate to the financial viability of the CIs to become self-
supporting once initial support from China dries up, promised benefits to the host 
university which haven’t eventuated, and problems with the partner university and the 
supplied teachers. All these point to the requirement of careful planning and negotiating 
mutually beneficial agreements. 
With foreign critics expressing concerns about the CIs, and many Chinese language 
educators saying they are purely educational, senior Chinese officials have been 
exercising a degree of sensitivity about the presentation of the CIs.460 Chinese officials 
accept that the CIs are a means to improve China’s international influence, and state 
that Chinese language and culture is not threatening to the rest of the world. While the 
CIs are expected to abide by some of China’s political priorities, they certainly have 
more freedom than a Chinese Government agency such as a consulate or state 
broadcaster; members of dissident groups are permitted to attend classes, and foreigners 
(or Taiwanese) have become directors. There is little evidence of China attempting to 
engage in subversion by undermining local societies or suppressing dissident groups 
through the CIs. Yet, the CIs do appear to be a Chinese attempt to gain soft power and 
influence foreign public opinion, however it is doing this in a transparent way that is 
consistent with contemporary international norms. 
Many studies view the CIs as an example of public diplomacy, rather than independent 
academic organisations or propaganda tools. An important issue for China and its 
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foreign relations is how effective the CIs are at public diplomacy. While progress has 
been made in improving its influence, problems persist with the negative international 
image of China’s political system, something that will hamper its soft power. China has 
worked hard to establish the CIs on terms that are acceptable to its foreign partners, and 
as a result, many foreigners stand to benefit from their services. While is little evidence 
to support the claim that the CIs are tools for subversion, and while the term “a 
goodwill gesture” conceals the attempt to gain international influence for China, the CIs 
can be a tool for engagement between China and the rest of the world.
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Chapter Six
CONCLUSION
Any nation’s foreign policy would be expected to change in 60 years, and Chinese 
foreign policy has certainly undergone a transformation since the founding of the 
People’s Republic in 1949, as has the country itself. While the CIs do represent a more 
cooperative and engaged Chinese foreign policy, some aspects have not changed; such 
as the basic goal of achieving China’s national development. There has been a 
broadening of Chinese thinking on international relations, as socialist ideology has lost 
some of its legitimacy, international values have been more accepted and there has been 
a revival of interest in traditional Chinese values. The CI programme is a major 
diplomatic initiative, which has raised some concerns especially among scholars in 
developed democracies. Accordingly, the method of this inquiry has been to discuss the 
evolution of contemporary Chinese foreign policy and the CIs from the perspective of 
four questions posed in the Introduction, which focused on history, theory, political 
independence and the concerns. 
Language and culture in contemporary Chinese foreign policy
The first question was “To what extent has Chinese foreign policy changed in the last 
60 years?” The answer is that it has undergone a substantial transformation. Before the 
CCP came to power, traditional Chinese values influenced the foreign policy thinking 
of subsequent Chinese leaders. These values viewed the country as the central state 
Zhong guo, the centre of the world as early Chinese knew it, in terms of culture, 
economics and politics.461 Classical Chinese thinkers also preferred diplomacy over 
coercion in foreign relations.462 Despite the period of revolutionary socialism during the 
Mao era, which threatened to destabilise the world, China has gradually become more 
effective at promoting its development and security within the international system. 
From its earliest days, the CCP tried to develop China through Marxist-Leninist 
ideology and it has tended to tightly manage China’s relations with the rest of the 
world. Current foreign policies are more pragmatic and allow much greater engagement 
as long it does not threaten the Party’s legitimacy. 
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Beijing established the CI programme because it accorded with previous CCP attitudes 
towards foreign relations. Among these is the principle of “non interference in internal 
affairs” which is defined as the avoidance of coercive military or economic measures
against other states, and has guided Chinese foreign policy since 1949.463 However, 
during this time China attempted to bypass diplomatic isolation whenever possible 
through personal contacts and friendship organisations as it displayed a distinctive 
tendency to personalise international relations. In this aspect, China is well suited to 
participate in an increase in interest in public relations-type diplomacy that uses 
language and culture to influence foreign public opinion.
China’s international relationships have became more engaged with previous 
ideological enemies following the open and reform policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping 
in 1978, and the political crisis in June, 1989 which resulted in urgent modernisation of 
China’s diplomacy. While the current political system can be described as a hybrid of 
one party rule and a liberal market economy, China’s foreign policies also reflect a mix 
of both Chinese and contemporary international values, although China is far from 
shedding characteristics of its authoritarian past. The Chinese elite has become much 
more sensitive to China’s international image, and a new strategy aims to play a greater 
role in world affairs and improve China’s international standing.
The CCP has undergone an extensive process of self-examination in the wake of the 
1989 disturbances and the collapse of communism in Europe, with the aim of staying in 
power. The Party has sought to reform itself organisationally and ideologically, 
strengthening legitimacy with the Chinese people by improving accountability, tackling 
corruption, and creating more effective representation within its ranks.464 The Party has 
always regarded the sphere of ideas and public discussion as linked to the interests of a 
particular class, and in a socialist country they must be managed in the interests of the 
People.465 As a result of the 1989 crisis, the Party has expanded propaganda activities 
and economic development as a means of ensuring legitimacy with the Chinese 
people,466 and began to increase the sophistication of measures to manage China’s 
image in international public opinion. Corresponding with greater awareness of the role 
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of diasporas and international public opinion in domestic politics, the CCP has adopted 
more effective Western techniques of information management such as public 
diplomacy. This amounts to a shift from coercive to persuasive information policies. 
The People’s Republic is adopting a foreign affairs strategy that aims to ensure stability 
in the world system rather than disrupting it, while advancing its own interests. Deng 
Xiaoping’s “lying low” strategy  from 1989 resulted in a low level of participation in 
the international system while continuing domestic economic modernisation.467 China’s 
actions in the contemporary environment began to reflect its increased economic power 
and status and has become more engaged and confident. Hu Jintao has adopted the 
strategy of “peaceful development” as the main platform of foreign policy which 
reflects the view that China’s development is tied to the stability of the world system. It 
is based on the position that China does not seek to disrupt the world system or threaten 
its neighbours while it continues to advance the interests of the Chinese people.  
Senior Party theorist Zheng Bijian who developed the peaceful rise/development
theory, proposed in 2003 that supporting interest in the Chinese language and culture 
among foreigners is a way of countering negative perceptions about the rise of China.468
As a result, Chinese outreach to foreign publics has gone into high gear and now 
includes a wider range of activities and organisations than in the past, such as the 2008 
Beijing Olympics,469 and the flagship of contemporary Chinese cultural diplomacy, the 
CIs.470 Such efforts have succeeded in improving the resonance of Chinese culture and 
language abroad, especially in South-East Asia. International engagement through
exchanges such as these provide opportunities for the international community to 
influence China, and urge reforms in domestic and foreign policies as well socialising 
China into the international community.471
The CIs are a major expansion of Chinese language teaching, although China has been 
involved in promoting the Chinese language to foreigners since 1949. Initial efforts 
were focused on the Soviet bloc and the third world, and became part of Deng’s refocus 
on economic development since 1978, as it was felt that foreigners who develop an 
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interest in learning the Chinese language are more likely to develop positive feelings 
toward China in the future.472 In the mid-1990s China’s diplomatic service became 
more professional as a result of better education,473 and this led to an increase in 
effectiveness in promoting the country’s interests. Chinese officials realised that 
coercive foreign policies such as firing missiles over Taiwan, could inadvertently 
isolate foreign audiences and were counter-productive towards national economic 
development.474
The CIs use the image of Confucius, an ancient contributor to traditional Chinese 
values, and this underlies a revival of Chinese cultural traditions and Confucianism 
within China. Confucianism derives from the ancient hero Kongzi who stood for 
harmony and stability, and has undergone highs and lows according to the political 
climate in China. Suppressed during the Mao era, there has been a revival of interest in 
Confucianism in China at a time when Marxism-Leninism has lost much of its 
legitimacy with the Chinese people. An increase in Confucian concepts such as he or 
harmony in the discourse of China’s most senior leaders on the international scene, 
reflects a fresh but dominant approach to international relations.475 Although the CI’s 
orientate themselves toward teaching the Chinese language and culture rather than 
passing on Confucian values, the image of Confucius, an ancient if somewhat 
manufactured, Chinese cultural icon476 has been chosen to maximise the global appeal 
of China itself. The CIs themselves reflects a new stage of confidence in Chinese 
foreign policy.
The CIs, soft power and public diplomacy
The initial question asked “To what extent does international relations theory provide a 
framework to describe the CIs?” This raises the concepts of soft power and public 
diplomacy which have been discussed by scholars in relation to the CIs. Contemporary 
international relations theory is being incorporated into the conceptual basis of Chinese 
foreign policy, away from a rigid adherence to confrontational Marxist-Leninism. 
Neoliberal international relations theory offers a broader understanding of a nation’s 
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power which has led to recognition of less tangible sources of power, in addition to 
more coercive means of achieving one’s goals. Neoliberalism recognises less tangible 
sources of power such as education, leadership and technology will become more 
relevant in the contemporary international environment of interdependence, 
multilateralism, and the peaceful resolution of disputes. The recognition in international 
relations theory of the importance of values, image, and institutions in international 
relations, reflects the importance of propaganda, and is also useful to this study. 
Chinese values such as Sinocentrism are giving way to greater acceptance of 
Westernisation and globalisation, so that the conceptual gap between China and the 
outside world is being narrowed.477
In addition to the coercive and economic aspects of a nation’s power, the ability to 
influence foreign public opinion to support the goals of one’s own country is 
increasingly being recognised as an important aspect of power. Soft power is likely to 
become more important and contested in the era of globalisation, and many in China 
think that the country needs to develop its soft power to become a global power. Soft 
power includes having an attractive culture, sporting success, a hold on the world of 
literature and entertainment, and a “strong” global language,478 which makes audiences 
more willing to accept the goals of that country. In addition, soft power also includes 
international respect for the social and political values practised domestically, and a 
foreign policy that has high legitimacy with its recipients.479 The concept of soft power 
has become popular in China, and the government has used it as the theoretical basis for 
the international promotion of China’s language and culture. There are many and 
growing examples of Chinese soft power, due to China’s rising economic status which 
has led to an increase in interest in China’s language and culture among foreigners. 
Public diplomacy is a contemporary term used to distinguish persuasive efforts to 
influence foreign public opinion, from the negative connotations of “propaganda.” It 
describes strategies to achieve soft power and consists of listening to international 
public opinion, international broadcasting, exchange diplomacy, and cultural 
  
477 Weixing Hu, Gerald Chan, and Daojiong Zha, "Understanding China's Behaviour in World Politics: An
Introduction," in China's International Relations in the 21st Century: Dynamics of Paradigm Shifts, ed. Weixing 
Hu, Gerald Chan, and Daojiong Zha (Lanham: University Press of America, 2000. p. 2
478 “Strong languages” refers to languages that are widely spoken and are associated with influential cultures such 
as those of many European powers: Ding, The Dragon's Hidden Wings: How China Rises with its Soft Power. 
Chapter 7
479 Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics. p. 31
121
diplomacy.480 Many other nations in the contemporary era are adopting programmes of 
strategic influence known as public diplomacy in an effort to gain soft power. 
Government sponsored cultural exchanges, language promotion, and cultural centres 
are examples of cultural diplomacy within the wider term public diplomacy, and this 
terminology best describes the CIs, rather than the term propaganda which has negative 
connotations of distortion. Additionally, authors have argued that the aim of both public 
diplomacy and propaganda is the same: to influence public opinion.481
Soft power and public diplomacy can be used to describe the CIs. While Nye developed 
the theory of soft power relatively recently, the concept of using culture to attract 
foreigners and influence them has been embedded in Chinese classical thinking for 
centuries. 482 The principle of “non interference in internal affairs” has been an 
important CCP policy since the 1950s, and in practise, this meant working quietly 
behind the scenes to achieve China’s goals.483 Liberalism, with its recognition of less 
tangible sources of power in addition to the coercive aspects, has given rise to soft 
power which has been enthusiastically adopted as a theoretical justification of the CIs. 
Together, these three elements reflect the broader conceptual sources of Chinese foreign 
policy, so that the conceptual gap between China and the outside world has 
narrowed.484
Cultural diplomacy, political independence and the CIs
How independent the CIs are from Chinese political influence is an important question, 
because the relationship between culture and politics is always a complex one when 
talking about cultural diplomacy. Traditionally, cultural diplomacy such as Alliance 
Française and the Goethe Institute were seen as independent,485 and critics of the CIs 
have suggested that they could be tools the CCP.486 However, while cultural diplomacy 
from many European nations is generally independent from universities, it is very much 
part of their country’s bureaucracy and subject to government direction.  The Chinese 
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government has conceded some of the direction of the CIs to that of their partners, 
although a relationship between the CIs and China’s Party-State system does exist. 
Language institutes within various cultural diplomacy programmes use a variety of 
financial and administrative arrangements, but the CIs are analogous to the language 
institutes of other nations, the difference is China’s political system. 
France invests the most in the world in its cultural diplomacy spending over a billion 
US dollars annually supporting its programmes, although Alliance Française is largely 
self-supporting.487 The British Council operates with a government/course fee income-
generating model, and it exists to provide cultural support for Britain’s foreign interests. 
The British Government supports it by around $US 260 million a year. 488 Many
international actors have public diplomacy programmes, and each one reflects that 
actors goals. For example, one of the aims of British public diplomacy is to improve 
trust where it is less trusted, and France seeks to continue its influence where the French 
language is spoken. China’s public diplomacy seeks understanding for its policies and 
political system, aims to convince audiences it does not have to be feared, and seeks 
trust and respect.489 The credibility of public diplomacy amongst the target audience 
ultimately determines their success in influencing public opinion, and it is against this 
measure that the CIs may struggle to compete.
Despite adopting some Western techniques of diplomacy, China has a different political 
system than liberal democratic regimes and different means of leading the state 
bureaucracy. The CCP is the sole governing party, and it is interlocked with the state 
bureaucracy in ways which tend to conceal its influence. Ostensibly, the CIs are 
administratively connected to China’s state bureaucracy and led by a leadership council 
(which has foreign representatives). Functionally however, the Party has mechanisms to 
ensure that its political priorities are carried out by the state bureaucracy; such as the 
nomenklatura system, the xitong (translation: system), and front organisations. 
These mechanisms reflect the dominance of the Party over the state bureaucracy, and 
the importance it attaches to propaganda activities. Managing the sphere of public 
discussion is, along with managing economic development, the main means the Party 
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uses to ensure its legitimacy in the absence of an electoral mandate.490 Chinese leaders 
have recognised that cultural differences can be a factor in difficulties they have had in 
the international area, and are becoming better at communicating their message.
Despite the influence from China, the CIs are generally joint ventures and foreigners are 
represented on the CI Leadership Council, and local organisations. The CI Leadership 
Council has five out of thirty-three positions reserved for foreigners and the CIs around 
the world are generally governed by a majority of representatives from the local 
community. Directors interviewed by Jessica Shepherd stated that China lets local 
institutes run their own affairs.491 University officials spoken to in research indicated 
that they would not let China dictate terms of the CIs that would compromise local 
values such as academic independence.492 This model represents a higher degree of 
political independence from the CCP than it has allowed before, and an attempt by 
China to make its publicity acceptable to its audience. There are some mechanisms that 
connect the CIs to China’s political system, but the public diplomacy of other nations is 
not independent from their political system either.
Assessment of criticism
One of the initial questions for this thesis was, “Are the CIs a tool for subversion or a 
bridge for understanding?” The answer, according to this research is neither; they are
part of China’s public diplomacy. CI officials maintain they are merely meeting the 
demands of foreigners who wish to learn the Chinese language and they are not 
promoting any political viewpoint in doing so. However, some scholars have argued 
that should the CIs become directly involved in academic research this will open them 
to be criticism for being vehicles of propaganda, because of their links to the CCP.493
However, there is little, if any, evidence of CIs trying to influence academic research on 
China. Their political influence is more in the form of persuading foreign audiences that 
China is an attractive place, an increasingly important goal in the light of concerns 
about China’s activities. While criticism of the CIs has been substantially more than 
that directed towards the cultural diplomacy of other countries, the CIs have been 
successful in increasing the resonance of Chinese culture - especially in Asia, and the 
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global popularity of the Chinese language continues to expand. The CIs are likely to 
reach their goal of teaching 100 million non-native speakers of Mandarin by 2020.
Despite the concerns that the CIs allow China an opportunity to influence the study of 
the Chinese language and of China studies generally, this has not prevented many 
universities from concluding agreements to host them. While they do have links to the 
CCP, the CIs are perceived to have a high enough degree of political independence 
from China, at least in the minds of many who work closely with them.494 It is apparent 
that China is trying to make the CIs acceptable to foreigners and to make its culture and 
language accessible to them. Chinese universities have promoted the CI programme
through existing links with foreign universities, and in this way the programme has 
been able to benefit from the reputation universities in developed democracies have for 
independence and objectivity. Arrangements formed to host CIs have had to meet the 
objectives of the foreign partners in which they are located, such as protecting academic 
independence from any political basis. There are a variety of different institutions 
involved and different hosting arrangements within those institutions. Many learning 
institutions in developed democracies are involved in other partnerships with 
commercial organisations, and in some cases, foreign governments. CI directors often 
come from their local community and establish links with the community and related
organisations such as Chinese teachers in High Schools.
China prefers universities as hosts, because they provide the CIs with authority and 
connection to the community that previous Chinese cultural centres located in foreign 
countries lacked.495 Many of the top-ranked universities in the world however, have 
chosen not to accept CIs, as maintaining their political and financial independence is 
more important than the benefits CIs can offer. Other learning institutions who have 
hosted CIs have chosen to distance them from academic activity, while the CIs 
concentrate on outreach to the local community. CIs bring a host of benefits to learning 
institutions such as improving links between China and local communities and meeting 
their demand for information about China. Therefore, academic independence is but 
one of the many factors that learning institutions have to weigh up when they consider 
whether a CI will contribute to the institutions long and short-term social and economic 
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priorities. The CIs are not only carrying out Chinese government goals and adhering to 
Chinese regulations; they have to meet conditions of the host – such as protecting 
academic independence and respecting local laws and customs. 
Some critics have argued that the CIs can be a tool for propaganda, however, many 
studies view the CIs as an example of public diplomacy; a term that describes 
persuasive activities including cultural diplomacy, that are designed to influence foreign 
public opinion. Public diplomacy is experiencing an increase in interest not just from 
China but also from developed democracies, because influence over foreign “hearts and 
minds” is strategically important in the era of globalisation. Rumi Aoyama argues that 
the public diplomacy/propaganda distinction is of no significance because the public 
diplomacy emanating from less democratic nations tends to be propagandistic in nature 
while public diplomacy from a more democratic system tends to more accurately reflect 
that country’s culture. The culture presented in a public diplomacy programme is 
mediated by the originating countries’ political system.496 The aim is the same: to 
influence public opinion, while the difference lies in the political system. The key 
question is how credible is the message, and therefore how effective the public 
diplomacy/propaganda will be in achieving its objectives.
Arrangements to host CIs must respect local as well and Chinese laws,497 and this 
means that contracts must be on terms the Beijing finds acceptable,498 but they must 
also abide by host priorities. The CCP is sensitive about certain subjects such as the 
Cultural Revolution, the June 1989 crisis, Tibetan, Taiwan, and Xingjian independence, 
religious freedom, and democracy. It seeks to manage discussion on these topics and 
others that threaten its legitimacy. According to responses from a minority CI directors, 
China has little political influence on local institutes and those directors do not seek to 
exclude Chinese dissidents from classes, which like other university departments,
cannot be used to make political arguments. However, given that only 15% of Directors 
who were invited to comment actually did so, questions remain about what the silent 
majority of directors think on such issues, and why so many chose not to comment. 
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China sees the institutes as open to all people willing to learn about China, although
Chinese dissidents are wary of the CIs, and some scholars feel that they will push out 
Chinese organisations that cater to a more diverse representation of Chinese culture.
Given previous CCP policy that culture must be managed to serve the interests of the 
proletariat, and use of language policies to achieve national unity rather than represent 
China’s diversity, the CIs cannot be viewed as the only reliable source of information 
about China. Given the importance of the CIs to China’s diplomacy, future research 
may look at whether China does seek to use the CIs coercively.
While there has been some political concerns about the CIs, such as possible exclusion 
of dissidents499 and industrial espionage,500 the recent scholarly literature that is specific 
to the CIs is not highly critical.501 CI directors come from local communities, and 
reflect local values. For those working with CIs the main challenges are not about 
academic independence, but those relating to administrative issues and long-term 
financial stability. 502 Several interviewees stated that the CIs have helped meet 
university objectives of providing education to their community, and have deepened
local understanding of China. The CIs are language and cultural institutes that are part 
of Chinese attempts to gain soft power through public diplomacy, as many other 
developed democracies are also doing.
Final assessment: a tool for engagement
According to Philip Altbach of Boston College, the CIs are doing good work in 
promoting understanding about China, but there is a need for people to see the CIs for 
what they are. 503 They are not an academic department, but are in the same category as 
the public diplomacy of other countries: activity designed to influence foreign public 
opinion. The question should not be whether or not culture used as part of public 
diplomacy is an extension of government influence, but whether it provides an accurate 
picture of the society it seeks to represent – that will determine the success of the 
diplomacy. Traditionally, the CCP has sought to use Chinese culture such as cinema, art 
and literature to tightly manage society and to advance the interests of the People. Since 
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1978 there has been an increase in freedom of expression, but there are still sensitive 
subjects such as those which touch on the Party’s legitimacy such as the Cultural 
Revolution and the June 1989 disturbances, on which discussion remains managed. 
Although China’s cultural diplomacy has contributed to the global popularisation of the 
Chinese language, it is unlikely that the Chinese language will take over English as the 
global language in the near future. China will be slow in developing its soft power 
without dealing more directly with negative aspects of its international image such as its 
democracy deficit. The power to attract and influence audiences to China’s goals will 
depend on attraction of its domestic political values and foreign policies as well as 
interest in its language and culture. In the view of Ding and Saunders, China’s harmful 
corruption and reluctance to pursue wide-scale political reform has constrained its 
efforts in promoting its culture and language in the liberal democracies of the world.504
Nye argues that nations most likely to project soft power in an information age are 
those whose dominant ideas are closer to international norms.505 Despite the expanding 
engagement with the developed world, China must grapple with many challenges 
associated with global interdependency. 
While China’s re-emergence is likely to change the global balance of power, this is 
likely to be gradual while there are aspects of China’s foreign policy that do conform to 
norms governing international behaviour. China’s focus on the peaceful settlement of 
disputes, mutually beneficial economic ties, the need to address new forms of security 
threats as well as public diplomacy, are increasingly congruent with approaches 
advocated with the vast majority of the international community. Where this does occur 
(and the CIs are one example), several scholars argue that the rest of the world should 
be more active in engaging with China. This may go as far as rewarding responsible 
behaviour, and deepening China’s attempts at engagement.506
Soft power also, is more than just one way; other countries themselves may use their 
own soft power to influence China to improve democratisation and transparency, 
because it is more integrated into the world system compared to 60 years ago. Soft 
power is achieved not just through having an attractive culture, as no matter how 
  
504 Ding and Saunders, "Talking Up China: An Analysis of China's Rising Cultural Power and Global Promotion 
of the Chinese Language," p. 22.
505 Nye, Soft Power: The Means To Success in World Politics. p. 31.
506 Gill and Huang, "Sources and Limits of Chinese 'Soft Power'," p. 31.
128
independent it is from the political system, foreign audiences cannot help to be 
influenced by the domestic political system and its foreign policies. Foreigners with 
their own values who understand the Chinese language as a result of the CIs will be 
much more able to influence the domestic Chinese political process than foreigners 
have before. Like the Olympics, the CIs will increase the leverage foreigners have to 
influence China, and negotiate agreements.507 Rather than being seeing them as either 
threatening, or benign, the CIs can be a means of engagement between China and rest 
of the world. 
While China’s rise in economic and military power is a visible sign of its 
transformation, its rise in soft power is less obvious. Not only has Beijing adjusted its 
strategic perspective, but it has put many new measures in place of which the CIs are 
one. While the CIs have helped increase the resonance of Chinese culture abroad,  
China’s “new diplomacy” 508 has increased Beijing’s agenda-setting capabilities
amongst global public opinion. These changes will have far-reaching effects on the 
world. However, China will have to grapple with many limitations with such a rise 
which has resulted in greater engagement and responsibilities. China’s soft power push 
lacks effectiveness, because it avoids the negative aspects of the Party-States’ image 
such as its lack of democracy and transparency, with the result that Beijing cannot yet 
achieve all the outcomes it wants. 
The CIs reflect a new confidence in China’s attitude towards the rest of the world, and a 
greater opportunity for engagement. They are part of the CCP’s external propaganda 
system, and though them, China is succeeding in improving its international influence. 
The CIs need to be seen for what they are; namely public diplomacy, and not neutral 
scholarly institutions. Through the CIs, China is developing the “soft power 
architecture”509 of a major power. But soft power works in more than one way, and the 
CIs can also be an opportunity for greater international engagement with China; as 
when foreigners better understand China, they can contribute to exposing China to 
international values and themselves participating in the sphere of public discussion 
within China. Therefore, the Confucius Institutes represent a new confidence and 
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effectiveness in Chinese foreign policy, and one that increases the opportunities for 
engagement.
130
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